Pursuing justice in post conflict situations in Africa by Ndirangu, Stella Wambui
 PURSUING JUSTICE IN POST CONFLICT SITUATIONS 
IN AFRICA 
 
 
 
 
by  
 
 
 
 
STELLA WAMBUI NDIRANGU  
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 Magister Legum (Coursework) 
 
In the faculty of Law  
at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Mr. David Abrahams                                     Date: December 2013
DECLARATION 
  
  
Full name: Stella Wambui Ndirangu 
  
Student number: 209080421  
  
Qualification: LLM  
  
  
In accordance with Rule G4.6.3, I declare that pursuing justice in post conflict situations 
in Africa is my work and that it has not been submitted for any degree or examination in 
any other university. All the sources used or quoted have been duly acknowledged.  
  
 
  
Signed ……………………………. 
 
Date …………………………………  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
 
My sincere appreciation and thanks goes to my supervisor Mr. Abrahams, for his 
guidance and supervision, which contributed to ensuring I stayed the course with 
my research. It is because of his guidance that this treatise is a reality. Thank 
you very much sir.  
 
I wish to also thank Agnes Ndungu, a special friend I met during my first visit and 
semester at NMMU, for her constant support and for guiding me as I tried to 
familiarize myself with the Campus and its environs. The encouragement to finish 
well, Agnes is much appreciated. 
 
I wish to also thank my friends Rita Shako, Minnie Mangeli and Esther Waweru 
whose constant cajoling, reminded me to stay focused despite the demands of 
life and work. Your persistent support, encouragement and wisdom inspired me 
immensely.  
 
I also say thank you to my family, who have been my number one supporters 
through this journey, I remain eternally grateful for the reassurance and 
relentless encouragement. 
 
Finally my gratitude is reserved for the Almighty God; for His grace has been 
sufficient, in assisting me surmount all the difficulties as I pursued my studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
DECLARATION ..................................................................................................... i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................... ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................................... iii 
1 Introduction to the research ........................................................................... 3 
1. 1 Background to the research ....................................................................... 4 
1. 2 Scope of the research ................................................................................ 9 
1. 3 Motivation of the research ........................................................................ 10 
1. 4 Objectives of the research ........................................................................ 10 
1. 5 Importance and relevance of the study .................................................... 11 
1. 6 Research methodology ............................................................................ 12 
1. 7 Outline of the research ............................................................................. 13 
 
2 Tracing the origin of post conflict justice .................................................... 14 
2. 1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 14 
2. 2 Post World War II ..................................................................................... 15 
2. 2. 1 The cold war ......................................................................................... 16 
2. 2. 2 New dispensation in the 1980‟s ............................................................ 20 
 
3 Analysis of various post conflict justice mechanisms ............................... 23 
3. 1 Common terms used to define various justice approaches or options ..... 24 
3. 1. 1 Restorative justice ................................................................................ 24 
3. 1. 2 Deterrent justice ................................................................................... 25 
3. 1. 3 Retributive justice ................................................................................. 25 
3. 2 Justice through trials or prosecutions ....................................................... 26 
3. 2. 1 Domestic trials ...................................................................................... 27 
3. 2. 2 Traditional or community justice prosecutions ...................................... 27 
3. 2. 3 Ad hoc tribunals .................................................................................... 28 
3. 2. 4 Special or hybrid courts ........................................................................ 29 
3. 2. 5 The International Criminal Court (ICC) ................................................. 30 
3. 3 Truth commissions ................................................................................... 34 
3. 4 Institutional reforms .................................................................................. 36 
3. 4. 1 Constitutional reforms .......................................................................... 37 
3. 4. 2 Judicial and police reforms ................................................................... 37 
3. 4. 3 Legislative reforms ............................................................................... 38 
3. 4. 4 Land reform .......................................................................................... 38 
 
4 Transitioning from conflict: Experiences South Africa and Kenya ........... 39 
4. 1 The case study of South Africa ................................................................. 39 
4. 1. 1 History of the conflict ............................................................................ 39 
4. 1. 2 Transition negotiations ......................................................................... 42 
 iv 
4. 1. 3 The truth and reconciliation commission .............................................. 44 
4. 2 The case study of Kenya .......................................................................... 48 
4. 2. 1 Historical context .................................................................................. 48 
4. 2. 2 The negotiation to end the conflict ........................................................ 50 
4. 2. 3 The commission of inquiry into the post-election violence .................... 51 
4. 2. 4 The ICC intervention ............................................................................ 53 
4. 2. 5 National prosecutions ........................................................................... 56 
4. 2. 6 The truth justice and reconciliation commission ................................... 57 
 
5 African Union contribution to the fight against impunity in Africa ........... 64 
5. 1 The will to prosecute the former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré ............ 65 
5. 2 Supporting the International Criminal Court (ICC) or fighting it? ............... 67 
 
Bibliography ...................................................................................................... 77 
Academic Books .............................................................................................. 77 
Academic Articles ............................................................................................ 80 
International Instruments ................................................................................. 80 
Internet sources ............................................................................................... 81 
Cases .............................................................................................................. 84 
Legislation ....................................................................................................... 84 
 
 
 
1 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Post conflict justice is a concept that has in the last two decades gained notoriety and 
support across the world. The commitment by states to fight impunity by embracing 
accountability measures has increasingly gained support. This however, was not always 
the case. Before the 1980s the approach by most of the world was to turn a blind eye to 
serious violations committed during wars, insurgencies and serious conflict. This was 
done in the name of respecting state sovereignty, where other states were required to 
respect the conflict state by not intervening irrespective of egregious violations being 
committed to mankind. 
 
The tide eventually changed and many states have adopted numerous instruments as a 
sign of their commitment to fight impunity and bring accountability to the perpetrators of 
serious conflict. African states embraced this development, in 1998 during the Rome 
conference where the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court was adopted. 
African states participated in large numbers during the negotiations. Subsequently, 
African states signed and adopted the Statute overwhelmingly. To date, 33 African States 
have ratified the Rome Statute making Africa the most represented region in the Rome 
Statute system.  
 
With Africa‟s share of countless conflicts, where serious human rights violations have 
been violated, post conflict justice is increasingly a reality in Africa. The application of 
post conflict justice is an emerging and ever evolving field in Africa. 
 
The implementation of post conflict justice has been the center of contested debates. 
These debates have in the recent past become more pronounced especially where 
international intervention has been applied in assisting African post conflict societies to 
deal with the past and bring accountability. The impact that the accountability 
mechanisms play in restoring a post conflict society has been overshadowed by these 
debates. This study therefore seeks to provide a balanced discussion on the role that the 
accountability mechanisms can play in African post conflict societies. 
 
2 
 
The study gives an overview of the evolution of post conflict justice and also looks into 
the different post conflict justice approaches adopted by African countries and their 
potential role in accountability and societal healing. 
 
The empirical cases of South Africa and Kenya are analysed in the study as practical 
examples of the application of post conflict justice approaches. The impact of the 
accountability mechanisms adopted is also discussed. 
 
The unique role that the African Union plays in fighting impunity in the continent is also 
discussed and the impact of positions taken by the continental body on accountability in 
post conflict countries is analysed.  
 
In the end the study seeks to establish the growing pattern in Africa in dealing with post 
conflict situations and recommendations are made in the final chapter on how to improve 
the general approach by Africa to eradicate the culture of impunity for serious crimes 
committed in the continent.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1 Introduction to the research  
 
In the last decade there has been renewed debate about justice and peace in the African 
continent mainly fuelled by accountability mechanisms that have been ignited by post 
conflict agendas of rebuilding the societies.  The commitment by governments to pursue 
justice for the victims of the serious conflicts in Africa has not been consistent. 
Increasingly African leaders are viewed to be less committed to accountability for serious 
crimes committed in the continent.  
 
Analyzing the current situation on how African states have responded to post conflict 
accountability becomes important. This treatise will focus on the experiences of post 
conflict states in the continent in dealing with the causes of conflict and in particular in 
pursuing justice for the crimes committed during the conflict. The importance of pursuing 
legal accountability and justice for human rights violations committed during conflict and 
how this contributes to fighting the culture of impunity, and rebuilding and maintaining 
peace after conflict will be analysed. The research will also analyse the experience of 
select African1 countries that have had processes seeking accountability for serious 
violations either domestically or through regional or international institutions.  
 
This pursuit of justice and accountability in post conflict situations is also referred to as 
transitional justice.2 There are a variety of transitional justice mechanisms which can help 
affected societies start afresh. These are based on international human rights and 
humanitarian law that demands that states halt, investigate, punish, repair and prevent 
human rights abuses. These approaches include prosecutions, informal and traditional 
justice mechanisms, lustration measures, truth commissions, amnesty and immunities 
from prosecution, reparations, memorialization and reconciliation.3 The research seeks to 
establish a link between justice and peace through the prism of the mechanisms that 
seek to establish accountability and justice through retribution.   
                                                 
1
 The research focuses primarily on the experience of South Africa and Kenya. Other country experiences will 
also be referred to enrich the research albeit not in greater detail.  
2
 Transitional justice concerns a range of different mechanisms applied by states or societies seeking to 
reform heal and transit from illegitimate and repressive rule or situations of conflict to national restitution and 
good governance. 
3
 KHRC, ICJ Kenya and ICPC Transitional Justice in Kenya: A toolkit for training and engagement (2009) 18. 
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1. 1 Background to the research  
 
From the mid – 20th Century to the present, wars, insurgencies, ethnic unrest, and the 
repressive actions of authoritarian regimes have produced enormous human suffering 
and the deaths of tens of millions, the majority of whom have been civilians. These 
conflicts often involve significant and systematic violations of fundamental human rights, 
including genocide; institutionalized impunity protects perpetrators while victims‟ 
demands for accountability are ignored. More often than not, justice for past atrocities is 
sacrificed for political expediency, often as a means to negotiate the end of a conflict.4 
 
In post-colonial Africa, the continent witnessed the prevalence of undemocratic and 
dictatorial regimes that were characterized by gross violations of human rights, extra 
judicial executions and violent change of power. Most of these regimes institutionalized 
impunity borrowing from the previous colonial regimes where repression, dispossession 
and oppression were standard practices. For the most part, these regimes successfully 
manipulated ethnic diversity and economic underdevelopment to maintain power. 
Generalized impunity by governments in turn fostered the conditions for state weakness 
and the civil wars that have engulfed Africa since the 1990s.5   
 
In the past many accounts of atrocities were told as if nothing could be done. Today, 
however, increasingly there is a sense that those who commit those brutal acts should be 
punished and perhaps more importantly this is coupled with a demand for retributive 
justice.6 This can be attributed to a major policy shift both morally and politically grounded 
that occurred in the mid- 80s onwards, when the UN, the Inter-American human rights 
court and NGO‟s cooperated to develop both the norm and duty to prosecute the crimes 
of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.7 This in turn led to the 
establishment of international and national mechanisms to ensure that this demand can, 
at least in some cases be met. 
 
                                                 
4
 Bassiouni and Rothenberg Facing Atrocity: The Importance of Guiding Principles on Post-Conflict Justice 
(2007) 1. 
5
 International Peace Institute Peace, Justice and Reconciliation in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges in 
the Fight Against Impunity (2013) 7.  
6
 International Council on Human Rights Policy Hard Cases: bringing human rights violators to justice abroad, 
A guide to Universal Jurisdiction (1999) 1. 
7
 These crimes are also referred to as the core crimes.  
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International tribunals were the first to be established to put on trial people accused of 
committing crimes against humanity and war crimes in Nuremberg and Tokyo in 1945 
and 1946 after the Second World War. The former Yugoslavia8 and Rwanda were the 
next countries to establish international tribunals in 1993 and 1994.9 The Rwandan and 
Yugoslav tribunals fuelled the widespread belief that a permanent international criminal 
court was desirable and practical.10 The idea of an international criminal court which had 
captured the legal imagination for well over a century became a reality on 18 July 1998 
with the adoption of the Rome Statute at the Rome Conference. After attracting the 
necessary ratifications the statute entered into force on 1 July 2002.11  
 
In addition to these international mechanisms, some national governments have set up 
local institutions to deal with these abuses either through either through prosecutions or 
through various models for reconciliation, for instance the South African establishment of 
a truth and reconciliation commission which is arguably the continent‟s best known 
example of restorative justice.12 With reference to prosecutions there has been an 
increased agitation from the African continent to have trials of perpetrators of serious 
violations committed in the continent tried in Africa either by their countries or other 
countries willing to do so. These efforts have been catalyzed by the feeling that the 
international institutions were unfairly targeting African countries by opening 
investigations and prosecutions in Africa and not countries in other continents. The 
African Union has led the African States in leveling these complaints in various fora, 
particularly at the African Union Heads of States and Governments bi-annual summits. 
 
A key question facing African democracies emerging from civil conflict has therefore been 
how best to deal with the painful legacy of the past, and in many cases all too recent 
violence, while at the same time maintaining the fragile social harmony that often 
characterizes post-conflict societies. Should priority be given to bringing the perpetrators 
of past human rights violations to justice, thereby combating the culture of impunity that 
                                                 
8
 The international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was established by the UN Security Council in 
1993.  
9
 The international criminal tribunal for Rwanda was established through the UN Security Council Resolution 
955 of 8 November 1994. 
10
 ISS Report on the symposium on the investigation and prosecution of „core international crimes‟ and the 
role of the International criminal Court in Africa (2006) 2. 
11
Du Plessis “Complementarity; a working relationship between African States and the International Criminal 
Court” in ISS Africa Guide to International Criminal Justice (2008) 123. 
12
 KHRC, ICJ Kenya and ICPC Transitional Justice in Kenya 44. 
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has come to characterize many civil conflicts? Or is it more important to start by focusing 
on measures designed to ensure peace and stability, and with them the prospects for a 
country‟s longer-term recovery are bolstered?13 
 
The link between criminal justice and sustainable peace is not always clear cut. In African 
countries that have been consumed by conflict, such as the Central African Republic, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Sudan. The debate over whether justice 
ought to precede peace or if at all justice is necessary has been one of the most heated 
and prominent discussions and is often referred to as the “peace vs. justice” debate.14 In 
these countries, the crucial issue is whether those responsible for atrocities committed 
during conflict ought to be prosecuted notwithstanding other possible opportunities for 
peace and reconciliation through other means such as the truth and reconciliation 
mechanisms adopted by post conflict societies such as South Africa and Sierra Leone, 
the use of traditional justice mechanisms such as the gacaca courts in Rwanda that were 
used to complement the work of the ICTR or even through establishing principles of 
„amnesty for truth‟ as adopted by the South African truth and reconciliation commission.15  
 
Presently, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has assumed the role of meting out 
punitive justice for those considered to be most responsible for genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. In the last decade the International Criminal Court has 
engaged Africa fervently, investigating and indicting those bearing the greatest 
responsibility for the egregious crimes committed during conflict in their states. The great 
lakes region which has a history of intertwined conflict and insecurity can offer testament 
to this. The court has to date opened eight situation investigations. All of these are in 
Africa16 and more specifically in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Sudan, the 
Central African Republic, Kenya and more recently in Cote d‟ Ivoire, Libya and Mali. The 
persons targeted by the court in Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic 
and Uganda have been leaders with past records of abuse in the government, military or 
rebel groups. The issuance of the first warrant against a sitting head of State - Sudan‟s 
                                                 
13
 IDEA Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after violent conflict learning from African Experiences (2008) 
III. 
14
 IRRI In the interests of Justice? Prospects and challenges for International Justice in Africa (2008) 57. 
15
 Ibid 13. 
16
 IRRI In the interests of Justice?  8-9. 
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President17 was the one that actively intensified the long running debate about whether 
seeking justice for grave international crimes interferes with prospects for peace.18 The 
African Union having rallied its support for President Omar al-Bashir made a declaration 
during its 13th ordinary summit held in Sirte, Libya19 that they would not cooperate with the 
ICC. The member states who supported the declaration took issue with the ICC and 
indicated they felt that the ICC was biased towards Africa as all its investigations to date 
have „targeted‟ African States.20  
 
These arguments and misconceptions have found fertile ground amongst anti-ICC 
proponents. This is despite thefact that other than Sudan and more recently Kenya, Libya 
and Cote d‟ Ivoire, the other four situations before the ICC – Uganda, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic and Mali, are a result of the 
governments of these countries inviting the court to open investigations and prosecutions 
in their countries. The anti-ICC proponents have used their strong stand against the court 
to discredit it in the continent and they seem to be gaining ground. This situation is best 
exemplified by the results of the 2013 elections in Kenya where accused persons before 
the ICC vied for the presidency and deputy presidency positions. In the campaigns the 
two used the anti-ICC rhetoric as a campaign tool and successfully convinced a 
substantial portion of the populace to vote them despite the ICC charges against them.  
Many analysts have observed that this indeed was a referendum against the ICC and the 
actual role it is playing in African societies.21  This hostility towards the ICC from African 
states has led to many questions being asked as to the efficacy of the ICC in meting out 
punitive and preventive justice.  
 
The existence of a concomitant relationship between punitive justice and peace and the 
role of the ICC in fostering such a relationship divides opinion from Khartoum to Freetown 
and from Nairobi to Johannesburg. While at the moment it seems practically futile to build 
consensus on this subject, it is nonetheless important to try and find out whether there is 
                                                 
17
 On March 4, 2009 The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for President Omar al-Bashir 
of Sudan on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
18
 Human Rights Watch Selling Justice Short: Why Accountability Matters for Peace (2009) 1. 
19
 More often referred to as the AU Sirte declaration.  
20
 Mbadlanyana “AU South Africa and the ICC” (24 July 2009) 
http://www.internationalpeaceandconflict.org/profiles/blogs/au-south-africa-and-the-icc (accessed 2013-05-
20). 
21
 Hansen “What‟s next for Kenya and the ICC?” (25 April 2013) http://thinkafricapress.com/kenya/whats-
next-kenya-and-icc  (accessed 2013-04-20). 
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common thread, a pattern or link between the two. This will not only inform healthy 
debate, it may also assist us in appreciating the role that criminal prosecutions whether 
by national or international courts, may play in attaining sustainable peace in the 
continent. After that we can answer the question as to whether accountability through 
prosecutions are really needed in Africa when rebuilding and maintaining peace. 
 
In certain regions where conflict is endemic, such as the Great Lakes region, the need for 
imposing punitive justice as a means of ending impunity is viewed as fairly imperative. In 
Kenya for instance, in March 31, 2010 the ICC‟s pre-trial chamber gave the prosecutor 
the go ahead to initiate investigations for the 2007 post election violence and indict those 
responsible.22 The results of the investigation resulted in charges being presented before 
the pretrial chamber of the court with respect to six high profile citizens. The charges 
were confirmed for four of those individuals having been adjudged as the most 
responsible for the crimes against humanity committed in Kenya in the aftermath of the 
2007/8 post election violence. Two of those individuals standing trial before the court are 
currently the president and deputy president of Kenya having won the 2013 elections. In 
Sudan, a sitting president was indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity 
committed in the troubled Darfur region,23while in Uganda the ICC is keen to ensure that 
the leader of the malignant Lord Resistance Army, Joseph Kony, responsible for 
conscripting young children into armed conflict is apprehended as soon as possible.24 
 
Despite the concerted efforts of the ICC, many still view the link between sustainable 
peace and punitive justice as tenuous, blurred and incomprehensible. At times, this is 
informed by the perceived negative repercussions associated with prosecuting 
perpetrators of serious crimes. If such prosecutions unearth hidden atrocities that reopen 
old wounds then some may prefer not to opt for such punitive justice. If prosecuting may 
lead to ethnic stigma or elevation of ethnic communities as victims by virtue of the 
                                                 
22
 Human Rights Watch “ ICC Judges approve Kenyan investigation” (31 March 2010) 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/03/31/icc-judges-approve-kenyan-investigation (accessed 2013-05-3). 
23
 International Criminal Court ICC-02/05-01/09 Case The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir 
http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/related%20cases/icc020
50109/court%20records/chambers/ptci/3?lan=en-GB (accessed 2013-05-03). 
24
 An arrest warrant for Joseph Kony was issued by the International Criminal Court on 7 July 2005 and 
amended on 27 September 2005. Joseph Kony has been charged on the basis of his individual criminal 
responsibility with 12 counts of crimes against humanity and 21 counts of war crimes. See the Hague 
Justice portal http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/8/193.html (accessed 2013-05-3). 
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accused person belonging to a particular ethnic community25 then again some reconsider 
the need for meting out punitive justice. If the prosecutions are being conducted, not by 
the ICC, but by a local tribunal that is perceived as biased from the outset then the 
answer is still the same,26 prosecuting is not necessary. The observations made above 
lend credence to the need to scrutinize the role that different justice models that have 
been adopted in post conflict societies in Africa have played in the attainment of 
sustainable peace in the continent.  
 
This study therefore aspires to interrogate the role of post conflict justice in rebuilding and 
maintaining peace in Africa. An analysis of Africa‟s experiences in responding to conflict 
in the pursuit of justice will be made.  
 
1. 2 Scope of the research  
 
The research will seek to answer the broad question as to whether pursuing justice in 
post conflict situations is necessary and whether this can operate in tandem with building 
sustainable peace in Africa. 
 
In addressing the broad question, the following secondary questions are addressed: 
 Should peace precede justice or should justice precede peace after conflict? 
 What are the forms of post conflict justice efforts that have been embraced by 
some of the post conflict societies and what are their effects on rebuilding and 
maintaining long lasting peace in Africa?  
 What is the impact of pursuing of accountability for perpetrators of human rights 
violations?  
 Should criminal prosecutions be conducted and against whom should they be 
instituted after conflict? 
                                                 
25
 The recent election of President Kenyatta and his Deputy William Ruto in Kenya has been attributed to the 
perception by the citizens from their ethnic communities that the communities were being targeted by the 
international criminal court. This was one of the tools used by the two to woe voters while campaigning and 
an analysis on the votes the two received across the country shows that a large majority came from their 
respective ethnic communities.  
26
 Divergent views on these issues can be seen in the Refugee Law Project, “Peace First Justice Later,” 
Working Paper No. 17, July 2005; the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and the Human 
Rights Center (HRC) at the University of California Berkeley, “Forgotten Voices: A population based survey 
on attitudes about peace and justice in Northern Uganda” July 2005; and United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights “Making Peace our Own: Victims” Perceptions on Accountability, 
Reconciliation and transitional Justice in Northern Uganda,” 2007.   
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 What has been the impact of prosecutions instituted in Africa? Have they served 
their intended purpose? 
 
1. 3 Motivation of the research 
 
This research is relevant as conflict has bedeviled many African countries over the years 
and the debate on peace versus justice has become topical. There is need to contribute 
to the debate with regard to the role that justice plays in post conflict situations and more 
so in Africa. The research is also motivated by the need to bring to light the dynamics of 
contemporary conflict resolution processes and the impact they have had in the African 
continent with a view of providing literature for future considerations of mechanisms to be 
taken up or supported in rebuilding societies. This will be informed by international 
Instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights27, the 
Universal Declaration28, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment29, the Rome Statute, the Geneva Conventions30 and 
the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of Genocide31 amongst 
others, regional instruments such as the African Charter and the African Court on Human 
and Peoples‟ Rights Protocol. National laws that have been enacted and used in 
enforcing post conflict justice will also be relied on.  
 
1. 4 Objectives of the research 
 
The research aims to investigate the role that pursuit for accountability and justice play in 
maintaining and rebuilding peace in post conflict African societies. The general objectives 
of the study are: 
 
(a) To examine literature on justice initiatives in Africa conducted during after civil 
conflict. 
                                                 
27
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-
2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
28
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. 
Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
29
 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for 
signature Feb. 4, 1985, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention against 
Torture]. 
30
 The Geneva Conventions entered into force on 21 October 1950. 
31
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. 
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(b) To examine the different approaches that have been used in post conflict 
societies in pursuit of justice and accountability. 
(c) To examine how prosecutorial mechanisms fair against other forms of justice 
initiatives aimed at maintaining and rebuilding peace in Africa. 
(d) To critically examine whether pursuit of accountability and justice in African 
societies contribute to the attainment of lasting peace in the continent. 
(e) To make recommendations on how best the interests of maintenance of peace 
and establishing accountability for serious human rights violations can be 
approached.   
 
1. 5 Importance and relevance of the study 
 
The issue as to whether there should be pursuit of accountability for perpetrators of 
human rights violations through prosecutions when rebuilding and maintaining peace has 
generated a lot of heated debate in Africa. Part of that debate revolves around the 
argument that justice ought to precede peace while the other part argues the converse. 
The proponents of the need to establish accountability through prosecutions hold that 
accountability and prosecutions are essential since there can be no peace without justice 
and justice is an instrument of peace. While the proponents of the establishment of peace 
first then justice later hold that accountability and prosecutions are really not needed if 
peace is already existent. At the middle of the spectrum is the argument that prosecutions 
should only be conducted if circumstances permit.32  
 
This debate is very alive at the moment as African counties such as Sudan, Kenya, 
Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Cote d‟ Ivoire, 
Libya and Mali are currently undergoing ICC processes that seek to pursue accountability 
for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide and yet there has been increased 
opposition towards such a move which opposition has percolated even to the African 
Union.33 The recent election in Kenya of two accused persons before the international 
criminal court as president and deputy president further compounds the debate. There is 
therefore a need to assess the relationship between pursuit of justice and other 
                                                 
32
 IRRI In the Interests of Justice? 57-58. 
33
 The as established earlier in this chapter decided to back President Omar al-Bashir by declaring during the 
13
th
 African Union summit, non cooperation with the ICC with regard to the execution of the ICC arrest 
warrant against President Bashir.  
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accountability mechanisms in relation to the achievement of sustainable peace in view of 
the ongoing debate. This will provide invaluable insight into the role that initiatives aimed 
at establishing accountability for serious human rights violations play in the attainment of 
peace in Africa. If possible, a common ground may be found between all the viewpoints in 
the debate without comprising the need of meting out justice. But if this area of debate is 
not studied appropriately, ambiguity and uncertainty may take hold for a long time to 
come leading to more heated, uninformed and unyielding debate with no resulting benefit 
to the people of Africa. The information generated by the treatise will not only act as a 
general knowledge resource but also as a reference tool for those aiming to support such 
processes that promote the pursuit of justice in post conflict situations.  
 
1. 6 Research methodology 
 
The study will involve literature examination of primary sources such as constitutions, 
international treaties, conventions and statutes. Secondary sources will include case law, 
books, the internet, journals and newspaper articles.  
 
The study will heavily rely on secondary sources owing to time and financial resource 
constraints of accessing field data. 
 
While Africa has been selected as the focal point of study two countries, South Africa and 
Kenya have been selected to be the sample case studies. Various accountability 
processes have been undertaken in these countries after periods of conflict albeit with 
varying scope and periods. The selection of Kenya and South Africa is inspired by the 
fact that the two countries had historical inequalities that largely contributed to the conflict 
witnessed in the countries. On the face of it the conflicts do not portray a striking similarity 
but a critical look at the underlying causes reveals the existence of social inequity and 
inequality being one of the triggers for the conflict and violence. 
 
The approach used by the two countries in addressing the conflict has some similarities 
but with varying degrees of success in both countries. It is therefore important to critically 
look into the response by the countries, and asses the viability of the approaches used in 
relation to the pursuit of accountability and the fight against impunity in the continent.  
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The study utilizes the comparative analysis approach. It draws important lessons from 
various jurisdictions where the issue of post conflict justice has been experienced and 
dealt with. 
 
1. 7 Outline of the research  
 
Chapter 1:  Introduction to the research. 
This chapter will lay the background for the research. It will outline the main questions 
that the research seeks to answer and how these will be addressed. The chapter forms a 
roadmap for the reader on what to expect in the following chapters. 
 
Chapter 2: Tracing the origin of post conflict justice.  
This chapter will provide a historical context of the developments that led to the push for 
the establishment of post conflict justice mechanisms. There has been historical shift 
from an era when the serious violations would be ignored and societies would turn a blind 
eye to these atrocities, to an era when justice was considered necessary after the serious 
conflict regardless of where it was committed will be analysed.  
 
Chapter 3: Analysis of various post conflict justice mechanisms.  
This chapter will set out the different approaches and mechanisms that can be employed 
by a post conflict society as it seeks to accountably deal with the past.  
 
Chapter 4: Transitioning from conflict: South Africa and Kenya experiences.  
This chapter takes two countries and case studies their experiences in dealing with 
atrocities committed during conflict periods on the countries. The chapter also discusses 
the efficacy of the approaches taken by the two countries. 
 
Chapter 5: African Union contribution to the fight against impunity in Africa. 
This chapter will assess the performance of the African Union in fighting impunity.  The 
African order and recent paradigm shift from justice to injustice will be analysed.   
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations. 
The last chapter will summarize the conclusions drawn from the research as well as 
appropriate recommendations that the author will have deduced from the research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2 Tracing the origin of post conflict justice 
 
2. 1 Introduction  
 
From the mid- 20th Century to the present, wars, insurgencies, ethnic unrest and the 
repressive actions of authoritarian regimes have produced enormous suffering and the 
deaths of tens of millions, the majority of whom have been civilians. These conflicts 
involve significant and systematic violations of fundamental human rights including, 
genocide, torture, disappearances, massacres, rape and mass displacement.34 
 
Professor Schabas, aptly observes that in the past these crimes were committed as an 
overt facet of state policy, particularly within the context of war or colonial conquest, 
obviously therefore domestic prosecution was unthinkable, and even where the 
perpetrators did not in a technical sense benefit from some manner of legal immunity.35 
From the end of the 1940‟s to the mid 1980‟s the dominant strategy for those who 
committed grave human rights abuses was to try to „close the books‟ and look away from 
such painful legacies.36 
 
There was a level of reasonable presumption and confidence among the perpetrators that 
the international culture of impunity would effectively shelter the most heinous 
perpetrators of crimes against humanity. 
 
The inertia of legal systems where the crimes actually occurred did little to inspire other 
jurisdictions to intervene, although they had begun to do so with respect to certain other 
international crimes such as piracy and slave trade where the offenders were by and 
large individual villains rather than governments. In such instances the principle of 
universal jurisdiction was applied and this meant a state could bring proceedings against 
the perpetrators, regardless of the location of the crime and the nationality of the 
perpetrator or of the victims. 
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States however refused to exercise universal jurisdiction over other serious offences 
especially where perpetrated by the governments and defended the failure to act in the 
name of respect for state sovereignty. But this had a more sinister aspect for this 
complacency was to some extent a form of quid pro quo by which states agreed in effect 
to mind their own business. What went on within the borders of a sovereign state was a 
matter that concerned nobody but the state itself.  
 
This begun to change around the end of the first world war and is, indeed, very much the 
beginning of the story of the development of laws governing post conflict justice or 
international human rights law. These laws impose obligations on states and ensure 
rights to individuals. Because these obligations are contracted on an international level 
they pierce the hitherto impenetrable wall of state sovereignty. 37  
 
Shortly after the First World War, the allies took a strong albeit illiberal line on 
international criminal liability38 and from the statements made during and just after the 
war, it would appear that there would have been a systematic reckoning for international 
crimes. Although there were some domestic trials of some German nationals, there were 
unsuccessful attempts to bring the German emperor to trial before an international 
tribunal.39 The subsequent post war actions of the allies did not bear out their rhetoric.40 
 
2. 2 Post World War II 
 
Immediately after World War II, the allied powers took a political decision to provide a 
legal process for the prosecution and punishment for those who committed crimes in 
connection with the war.41 The emphasis on accountability was thus revived and it 
followed that as a result of the crimes committed by its officials and soldiers during the 
war, this prompted the creation by the allied powers of an ad hoc military tribunal at 
Nuremberg and a similar tribunal was constituted in Tokyo in respect of crimes committed 
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by Japan‟s leaders,42 which tribunals came to be known as the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
tribunals. This marked an important turning point in the development of international 
criminal justice. 
 
The tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo were established to try leaders of the war time 
German and Japanese governments for crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.43  
 
The appeal to certain „laws of humanity‟ and „dictates of public conscience‟ at Nuremberg 
and Tokyo established the foundation for a new code of international law. The Nuremberg 
principles reconfigured the relationship between the individual, state and the international 
community, while also recognizing the doctrine of universal jurisdiction for certain crimes 
considered jus cogens.44 Nuremberg trials provided a platform where individuals became 
responsible for international crimes irrespective of what domestic law may authorize.  
 
2. 2. 1 The cold war 
 
As the law of armed conflict developed in the mid nineteenth century, the idea of the 
establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute breaches of humanitarian law first 
emerged. The United Nations was thrilled by the work of these tribunals and in 1948 
adopted a resolution mandating the International Law Commission to begin work on the 
draft statute of an international criminal court. Unfortunately this enthusiasm for the 
establishment of a permanent international criminal court as generated by the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo tribunals was abandoned during the cold war.45 Silence, amnesia and amnesty 
then became the rule, a notable example being the trials of the junta leaders in Greece in 
1974.46 
 
However, rather than herald the emergence of an international criminal tribunal system, 
the onset of the cold war in 1947 effectively blocked the planning for the creation of a 
permanent international criminal court.47 
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Amongst the first legal foundations laid for the fight against impunity were the 1948 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949. The Four Geneva Conventions recognized the principle of 
universal jurisdiction.48  
 
The effect of the delay in negotiating for a permanent international criminal court was that 
the principle of universal jurisdiction combined with the rejection of state immunity as had 
been enshrined in the Nuremberg principles was practiced extensively even if this 
practice was greatly contested. 
 
A major policy shift, both morally and politically grounded, occurred in the mid-11980s. 
The global growth of a human rights culture blossomed into a new, now much wider, fight 
against impunity. There was development of both the norm and the practice of the duty to 
prosecute crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes.49 This in turn resulted in 
the increased use of the principle of universal jurisdiction where states were unwilling or 
unable to prosecute perpetrators of these grave crimes other States would undertake 
such prosecutions on their behalf. One of the cases that shaped the use of universal 
jurisdiction by states is the Pinochet case.  
 
Augusto Pinochet, former Chilean dictator had been accused of ordering killings, 
abductions and torture of over 1000 Chileans and others during his 17 years of military 
rule in Chile. In October 1998 a Spanish magistrate indicted him and issued arrest 
warrants. Six days later Pinochet was arrested in London where he was held for one 
year. During this year the House of Lords the highest court of the United Kingdom heard 
the case on whether the United Kingdom should extradite Pinochet. Pinochet‟s lawyers 
claimed he was immune from prosecution as he was a former head of state. The court 
rejected this argument and held that some international crimes such as torture could not 
be protected by former head-of-state immunity and that the extradition to Spain could 
proceed.50 In January 2000 however after protracted arguments on whether to extradite 
Pinochet the United Kingdom home secretary, Jack Straw ruled that Pinochet should not 
be extradited due to his failing health and freed him two months later allowing him to 
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return to Chile.51 Despite his release this case provided a good precedent for the exercise 
of universal jurisdiction and also defined the non-tolerance for the head of state 
immunities for serious crimes.   
 
Subsequently there was the establishment by the Security Council of the ad hoc tribunals 
of the former Yugoslavia in 1993 and Rwanda in 199452 as a response to the serious 
conflicts experienced in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 53   
 
The Rwanda and Yugoslav tribunals‟ fuelled widespread belief that a permanent 
international criminal court was desirable and practical, as they demonstrated that 
criminal justice for serious crimes was possible especially through the innovative criminal 
law jurisprudence they produced.54  
 
These other subsequent tribunals formed owe their creation in large measure to the 
legacy initiated at Nuremburg. The arrival of other international tribunals was heralded as 
a new found willingness of the international community to bring to book perpetrators of 
war crimes and gross or systematic violations of human rights.  
 
In the summer of July 1998, a majority of the world‟s states including a large proportion of 
African nations came together in Rome to draft a statute for a permanent international 
criminal court.55 After weeks of negotiations the Statute of the international criminal court 
was adopted on 17th July 1998 by an overwhelming majority of the states attending the 
Rome conference.56 The statute came into force in April 2002 after the requisite 
                                                 
51
 Transnational Institute Operation Exit: The political decision in the Pinochet Case (2000) 1.  
52
 United Nations Security Council Resolution 808 of 22 February 1993 and United Nations Security Council  
Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993. 
53
The ICTR was mandated to prosecute of genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian 
law committed in Rwanda and other neighbouring countries in during the conflict in 1994.
 
The ICTY was 
mandated to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. 
54
 ISS Report: The investigation and prosecution of „core international crimes‟ and the role of the International 
criminal Court in Africa (2006) 4. 
55
 The Court has the jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide. In addition the court‟s jurisdiction was extended during the Rome Statute Review Conference 
held in Kampala, where on June 2010 the State parties to the Rome Statute agreed on a definition for a 
fourth crime – the crime of aggression thereby giving the court jurisdiction to prosecute aggressor States 
where the UN Security Council gives the court a go ahead to proceed.  
 
56
 Du Plessis Africa Guide to International Criminal Justice 4. 
19 
 
ratifications were achieved. The establishment of a permanent international court was 
hailed as a landmark achievement for the international justice movement.57  
 
The international criminal court has taken over prosecution of serious international crimes 
at the international arena since its existence and is so far has served as the main avenue 
where states do not take up the challenge to conduct domestic prosecutions 
The international criminal court is currently looking at eight situations before it, these 
relate to conflicts in the Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African 
Republic, Sudan, Kenya, Libya, Cote d‟ Ivoire and Mali.58 
 
The court has jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and recently the crime of aggression. The court also has temporal jurisdiction over 
crimes committed after July 2002 after it became operational.59  
 
Due to the limited nature of the jurisdiction of the ICC some countries have continued to 
exercise the principle of universal jurisdiction over crimes considered serious that are out 
of the jurisdictional scope for the court. 
 
As seen from the developments covered so far post conflict justice mainly concentrated 
on bringing accountability to the perpetrators of serious crimes during conflict through 
prosecutions. Increasingly in the last two decades the focus has shifted from pursuing 
prosecutions only to using multi-pronged approaches that integrate other mechanisms 
that allow for reconciliation and building on the stability. 
 
The development of a body of international criminal law which imposes responsibilities 
directly on the individual and punishes violations through international mechanisms is 
recent. A state sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually supplanted by a human 
rights oriented approach. International law while of course duly safeguarding the 
legitimate interests of states must gradually turn to the protection of human beings.60  
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2. 2. 2 New dispensation in the 1980’s  
 
From the mid 1980‟s onwards, as the human rights culture that had begun to take root 
blossomed into a new much wider fight against impunity. States were more inclined to 
adopt and support accountability mechanisms. Concurrently however questions were 
asked about the applicability of systematic prosecutions in contexts where regime change 
is an extremely delicate or complex operation. Political, social, economic and cultural 
contingencies make it almost impossible for a society to fulfill the duty to prosecute.61 
 
The public debate on post conflict justice, political leaders, members of civil society and 
academics are divided on numerous points. By far the most divisive question is how to 
balance the demands of justice against the many political constraints. As is often the 
case in international affairs a variety of political considerations play out when dealing with 
post conflict situations. These considerations usually bring an outcome which upon 
reflection is neither good law nor sound policy. 62 
 
When a civil war, genocide, a brutal dictatorship or conflict ends the inevitable question 
arises of how to deal with those who have committed grave human rights abuses. The 
choice of retributive justice as a strategy to fight impunity has even been written into 
internationally brokered peace agreements, as in Guatemala, Sierra Leone and 
Burundi.63 
 
Those who emphasize the beneficial effects of prosecution bring forward two categories 
of arguments. One is victim-oriented: a post conflict society has a moral obligation to 
prosecute and punish the perpetrators, because retribution is exactly what most victims 
want. It serves to heal their wounds and restore their self-confidence because it publicly 
acknowledges who was right and who was wrong and clears the victims of any labels of 
being „criminal‟ that were placed by on them by the authorities of the past or, indeed by 
rebel groups or elites. The argument runs that only trials lead to a full recognition of the 
worth and dignity of those victimized by past abuses.64  
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A second set of arguments has to do with establishing and upholding peace and political 
stability, prosecutions will avoid unbridled private revenge. Otherwise victims may be 
tempted to take justice into their own hands. The risks then are vigilante justice, summary 
executions and spirals of revenge. In addition such self-help injustice can trigger social 
and political disturbances. Trials also protect against the return of those who were the 
cause of the miseries of war and repression. The survival of a newly established regime 
can be improved by swift and firm judicial action against those who are responsible for 
the gravest violations of human rights. In addition criminal courts establish individual 
accountability. This is essential to the eradication of the dangerous perception that certain 
communities are entirely responsible for violence and atrocities.65 
 
However the use of restorative justice has also become popular with recent initiatives of 
dealing with past conflict.  South Africa is a good example as during the post-apartheid 
era the country chose to use a truth and reconciliation process to deal with its past that 
also incorporated the granting of conditional amnesties to those who came forward and 
offered full disclosure and confessed to their crimes,66 thereby not giving justice 
prominence.   
 
Increasingly there has been an acknowledgement that justice and reconciliation are 
inherently and inextricably linked. In societies emerging from violent conflict, political 
reconciliation is not a utopian idea. It is often the only realistic alternative to enduring and 
escalating violence and a vital means of building a society based on the rule of law and 
social reconstruction. Charles Villa-Vicencio observes that it is unrealistic to ask victims 
and survivors of gross violations of human rights to reconcile in the absence of justice. 
However, he also adds that it is necessary to broaden the understanding of justice to 
include realistic options for building civic trust, the promotion of a human rights culture 
and the pursuit of economic transformation and is all about a holistic understanding of 
justice.67 
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In general impunity protects perpetrators while victims‟ demands for accountability are 
ignored. More often than not justice for past atrocities is sacrificed for political 
expediency, often as a means to negotiate the end of a conflict. Nevertheless, there‟s a 
growing international acknowledgement that building a responsive and democratic 
society in the wake of atrocity requires an open engagement with the demands of victims 
and a corresponding commitment to truth, justice and reconciliation. Increasingly the 
international community, governments and civil society organizations seek accountability 
for past atrocities as expressed through a diverse set of ideas and practices known as 
„post conflict justice‟.68 The development of post conflict justice represents a significant 
shift in the international politics of peace, security and national reconstruction, as well as 
an important stage in the evolution of the global movement to protect and defend 
fundamental human rights. 
 
Post conflict justice is premised on an understanding that domestic stability, security and 
democratic governance in the aftermath of atrocity are strengthened by a commitment to 
justice and accountability. Openly facing the legacy of the past is essential for preventing 
future victimization, achieving peace and reconciliation and protecting human rights.69 
 
There‟s no „one size fits all‟ approach to post conflict justice, the success and failure of 
the various components of such a process will depend to a great extent on the nature and 
dynamics of the state and situation in question.70 Different African states have after 
conflict adopted various modes of dealing with the past conflict and the chapters that 
follow will seek to analyse the benefits, successes and challenges that the different 
African responses have elicited and also highlight the opportunities that exist to 
strengthen post conflict justice responses in the future.  
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Chapter 3 
 
3 Analysis of various post conflict justice mechanisms    
 
Some of the main questions that arise in post conflict situations are: how do societies 
deal with a past characterized by gross human rights violations? What kinds of 
processes, judicial as well as non-judicial, are most likely to generate a sense of 
reconciliation? What are the dynamics of such processes and the conditions under which 
they develop? 
 
In seeking to answer these questions different post conflict societies have adopted 
different strategies and mechanisms to deal with the question of reconciling the affected 
societies. Also central to this question as to what reconciliation mechanism to adopt, a 
debate often emerges as to which justice is best suited in these post conflict situations 
justice in the form of trials or pursuit of accountability pursued or peace initiatives that are 
devoid of seeking prosecution and punishment for perpetrators of the conflict. 
 
Different transitional societies choose different objectives, and often pursue them in very 
different ways, usually because of political, social, economic and legal constraints after 
conflict.71 The post conflict justice debate sometimes posits mechanisms for addressing 
accountability as mutually exclusive alternatives. This debate has been advanced in 
various fora and depending on whether the debaters are inclined towards pursuing 
accountability and justice for the crimes committed during the conflict or immediately 
restoring peace for the communities or society. Often the debaters tend to take up 
positions supporting one of the aspects with those inclined towards accountability 
choosing justice while those inclined towards reconciliation being inclined more towards 
peace.  
 
This debate between peace and justice was succinctly summarized by Kofi Annan when 
he aptly observed:   
“Ending the climate of impunity is vital to restoring public confidence and building 
international support to implement peace agreements. At the same time, we should 
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remember that the process of achieving justice for victims may take many years, and 
it must not come at the expense of the more immediate need to establish the rule of 
law on the ground. We also know that there cannot be real peace without justice. Yet 
the relentless pursuit of justice may sometimes be an obstacle to peace.  If we insist, 
at all times, and in all places, on punishing those who are guilty of extreme violations 
of human rights, it may be difficult, or even impossible, to stop the bloodshed and 
save innocent civilians.  If we always and everywhere insist on uncompromising 
standards of justice, a delicate peace may not survive. But equally, if we ignore the 
demands of justice simply to secure agreement, the foundations of that agreement 
will be fragile, and we will set bad precedents. There are no easy answers to such 
moral, legal and philosophical dilemmas."72 
 
Although peace and justice seem inseparable natural allies in peace time, their 
relationship is fraught in the aftermath of conflict. Material and political obstacles are 
frequently encountered in seeking to restore both peace and justice simultaneously.73 
 
Schabas, a renowned scholar in the international criminal justice arena, argues that it is 
perhaps better to approach the post conflict problem as one requiring a multi-faceted 
approach, drawing upon various models, ranging from international tribunals to national 
courts as well as non-judicial or quasi-judicial institutions, such as truth and reconciliation 
commissions. This has been evidenced in Rwanda and Sierra Leone.  
 
This chapter seeks to delve deeper into analyzing the options or mechanisms that are 
usually available to post conflict societies as they endeavor to address the causes of 
conflict and prevent a recurrence of the conflict in the future.  
 
3. 1 Common terms used to define various justice approaches or options 
 
3. 1. 1 Restorative justice 
 
Restorative justice connotes that in some instances it is necessary to alter the form or 
degree of punishment to help rebuild relations between perpetrators and victims and 
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therefore to gradually restore the fabric of society as a whole. Proponents of restorative 
justice therefore do not necessarily oppose the need for punishment, but rather argue 
that in some cases there may be a compelling need to shape punitive measures towards 
more reconciliatory ends.74 
 
3. 1. 2 Deterrent justice 
 
Deterrent justice implies that perpetrators be punished to a degree that deters them or 
others from committing crimes in the future - punishment that maybe of greater, lesser or 
commensurate degree compared with their crimes. The primary intention of deterrent 
justice is to persuade potential criminals that it would be too costly to initiate or repeat 
such crimes.75  
 
3. 1. 3 Retributive justice 
Retributive justice on the other hand connotes that perpetrators should be punished to a 
degree commensurate with the severity of their crimes. The primary intention of 
retributive justice is to voice the community‟s disapproval of perpetrators actions. 
Pursuing post conflict justice is viewed as helping to instill confidence and trust in public 
life and to enhance the credibility of newly established democratic and human rights 
institutions, as it shows that perpetrators of war crimes cannot commit such crimes with 
impunity. So it‟s claimed that retributive justice pursued in the form of transitional justice 
is a condition not only for peace and security, but also for the establishment of functioning 
political institutions, it contributes not only to peace building but also to state building.76 
 
More fundamentally, the usual question is whether attempts to pursue retributive justice 
may be counterproductive from the perspective of reconciliation in cases where such 
attempts are likely to entrench social divisions and resentment through the creation of 
martyrs and perceptions of victor‟s justice. 
 
Post conflict justice can be implemented through a number of inter-disciplinary strategies 
including prosecutions, truth commissions, administrative measures, amnesty, 
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memorialisation and institutional reforms. These strategies and the various fora for 
implementing them are analysed below.  
 
3. 2 Justice through trials or prosecutions  
Prosecutions are often seen as a pragmatic form of retributive justice, the underlying 
presumption here being that for lasting reconciliation to take place the perpetrators must 
be held accountable and punished for their misdeeds. Prosecutions are also seen to 
affirm victims‟ rights which are perceived to be central to individual closure. Furthermore 
this retributive justice mechanisms help in making a break with an unjust order and is 
seen to be central to the establishment of respect for the rule of law.77   
 
The Statute of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), an 
institution designed primarily to prosecute and punish the main orchestrators of the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda – states that „prosecution would contribute to the process of national 
reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace.78 
 
The current prosecutor of the ICTR Hassan Bubacar, aptly observes that the official 
acknowledgement of victims‟ plight and the public exposure of the criminality of the 
perpetrators not only lays a foundation for healing on the part of the victims but also 
avoids ascribing guilt to the community or group from which the perpetrators come, and 
thereby contributes to ending the cycle of violence between antagonistic groups.  He 
further observes that; 
 
“Prosecutions relieve victims of the need to take justice into their own hands, which 
often becomes imperative when there is a perception that nothing has been done to 
make perpetrators pay for their crimes. Justice in the form of accountability thereby 
lends gravity and strength to the reconciliation process”.
79
    
 
Prosecutions in post conflict societies take various forms such domestic trials, traditional 
or community justice mechanisms, hybrid tribunals, ad-hoc tribunals and trials at the 
international criminal court.  
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3. 2. 1 Domestic trials 
 
In pursuing justice through prosecutions in any post conflict society the rule is that the 
trials should primarily be conducted domestically or nationally. This means that if the post 
conflict situation allows then any prosecutions that are undertaken to bring the 
perpetrators of the conflict to account should be before the domestic courts of the country 
recovering from the conflict.80 Usually a domestic law to govern such prosecutions is 
enacted as the laws of most countries do not contemplate the serious crimes committed 
during conflict but where such a law was existent before the conflict then this law will be 
applicable in the prosecution of the cases relating the conflict. A good example of a 
country that has effectively adopted this strategy is Rwanda, after the genocide the 
Organic Law No. 08/96 of 30th August 1996 on the organization of prosecutions for 
offences constituting the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity committed since 
1st October 1990 was enacted and it has been used to prosecute and sentence some 
perpetrators before the national courts. Another African country is Uganda where the war 
crimes division of the high court was established to deal with perpetrators of the northern 
Uganda conflict. In the two situations mentioned above it is important to highlight that the 
national mechanisms were established to run parallel to other international accountability 
mechanisms. 
 
3. 2. 2 Traditional or community justice prosecutions 
 
Traditional justice mechanisms have been used in Africa to reconcile communities, a 
good example being the gacaca courts that have been used in Rwanda to supplement 
other forms of prosecutions and to deal with a large section of middle and low level 
perpetrators of the genocide.  
 
In northern Uganda, traditional justice mechanisms have also been used to deal with 
those who are perceived to have been involved in the conflict in the northern Uganda 
area. These mechanisms however have been perceived by some as providing a soft 
landing for perpetrators of serious crimes because in most cases the perpetrators are just 
required to confess the commission of the crimes before the community after which 
traditional processes are used to initiate the person back into the community and the 
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community is required to forgive them and accept them. The objective is usually to 
reintegrate the perpetrators into their communities and reconcile them with the victims, 
through a process of establishing the truth, confession, reparation, repentance and 
forgiveness.81 
 
However, it is important to note that the supporters of this form of justice explain that 
traditional mechanisms have been used in African societies since time immemorial and 
have been effective, and therefore have an important role to play just as the other justice 
mechanisms. 
 
3. 2. 3 Ad hoc tribunals 
 
Where problems such as lack of independence and capacity in the domestic courts, fears 
of political instability or lack of political will militate against justice through trials, the 
situation is overcome through institutional innovation. Alternative mechanisms for 
retributive justice include trials in ad hoc tribunals.82 
 
These courts are designed to deal with specific conflicts and they were commonly 
established by the United Nations Security Council. In most circumstances they were 
established in circumstances where the affected country was not in a position to head the 
establishment of such a tribunal and therefore the seat of the court would be situated in a 
different country as the country in question was usually reeling from the effect of the 
violent conflict and therefore need assistance in setting up a credible mechanism to deal 
with the accountability problem. One of these is the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia established in 1993 based inThe Hague, Netherlands. The last of 
these courts to be established was the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
in 1994, which is based in Arusha, Tanzania. These two tribunals are currently finalising 
on their operations after having prosecuted and sentences many perpetrators of the 
Yugoslav and Rwanda conflicts.83  
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3. 2. 4 Special or hybrid courts 
 
Special or hybrid courts are preferred where there are problems of lack of independence 
of the judiciary or capacity problems in the domestic courts. Their composition is usually 
made up of both local and international personnel. The international personnel are meant 
to restore confidence that such an institution can deliver without being compromised. The 
inclusion of local personnel also contributes to legitimizing the process as a national 
process thus promoting local ownership and acceptance of the process. Hybrid and 
mixed national trials mostly apply in context of ethnic violence and systematic oppression 
as national institutions are vulnerable and lack legitimacy.84 
 
While international involvement may make these processes stronger in institutional terms, 
it seems that from the perspective of domestic reconciliation local ownership of the 
process is central.85 An example of a hybrid court is the Sierra Leone tribunal which was 
jointly set up by the government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations with a mandate 
of trying those who bore the greatest responsibility for serious violations committed during 
the Sierra Leone civil war. The court officials were appointed by the Sierra Leone 
government and the United Nations.  
 
Other African countries have tried to embrace this approach in dealing with post conflict 
situations for example in 2008 when Kenya was seeking to address its post-election 
violence, two commissions of inquiry were set up. One to investigate the causes of the 
violence and make recommendations to avoid a repeat and the second to investigate 
what had gone wrong with the election whose results triggered the violence. The coalition 
government agreed that the commissioners who were to serve in the two commissions 
would be drawn not only from local experts but also other regional and international 
experts. This approach was motivated by the desire by both sides of the coalition to 
reduce the chances of any party compromising the commissions, given the great mistrust 
between the coalition government partners at the time.  
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3. 2. 5 The International Criminal Court (ICC) 
 
This court was established in 200286, as a response to the long interest by states to 
establish a court that would deal with the perpetrators of egregious human rights 
violations and also to stop the reactionary establishment of ad hoc tribunals to deal with 
violent conflicts that would shock humanity such as the Yugoslav atrocities and the 
Rwanda genocide of 1994, that led to the establishment by the UN security council of the 
ICTY and the ICTR in 1993 and 1994 respectively. 87 
 
The International Criminal Court is established through the Rome Statute, the Statute 
empowers it to investigate and prosecute serious crimes being the crimes of, genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. 
 
The ICC operates firstly, under the principle that national courts take precedence in 
conducting investigations and prosecutions, only when the country is unable or unwilling 
to conduct investigations and prosecutions does the ICC intervene.88  This in essence 
means that before the court intervenes in investigating or prosecuting for the crimes it has 
jurisdiction over, it has to be satisfied that the crimes cannot be dealt with by the state in 
question through its domestic institutions. 
 
Secondly, the court only targets those who are considered to be the most responsible for 
the atrocities committed during the conflict, these being the high level perpetrators. This 
is usually in the hope that the state emerging from the conflict will deal with the middle 
level and low level perpetrators within its domestic judicial institutions. The ICC has to 
concentrate on the high level perpetrators because in most instances they are the 
untouchables in their respective countries and also because the court‟s capacity can only 
allow it to handle a small number of accused persons.  
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The ICC assumes jurisdiction over a situation either by invitation by a country that is a 
state party to the Statute to enter its territory to investigate and prosecute; this process is 
called a referral.89 Secondly the court can assume jurisdiction through a referral by the 
United Nations Security Council where the court is requested to investigate and see if the 
crimes under its jurisdiction have been committed in a particular country where there was 
a conflict or has an ongoing conflict.90 In such situations the country in question is usually 
not a state party to the Rome Statute. Lastly the court through the prosecutor can on its 
own motion using its proprio motu powers open investigations and investigations and 
prosecutions in a country that has ratified the Rome Statute.91However to ensure the 
prosecutor‟s powers are checked the Statute provides that in order for him to exercise his 
proprio motu powers he has to first seek the authority of the pre-trial chamber where he 
must show reasonable cause to be allowed to open investigations and prosecutions, 
which means he must show that particular country is either unwilling or unable to 
investigate and prosecute.92 
 
Since the coming into force of the ICC on 1st July 2002 the court currently has before it 
eight situations that it has opened investigations and prosecutions in.  All eight situations 
are in Africa, they are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Central African 
Republic, Sudan, Kenya and more recently Libya, Cote d‟Ivoire and Mali.93 This court is 
therefore an important accountability mechanism in this analysis of the African 
experience in dealing with accountability in post conflict situations. 
 
In the eight cases before the ICC four of them were self-referrals by the countries where 
they asked the ICC to intervene and open investigations because they did not have the 
capacity to do so. In December 2003 the government of Uganda became the first State to 
refer a conflict situation to the ICC - the Northern Uganda conflict. The Democratic 
Republic of Congo was the second country to refer its conflict to the ICC, the country 
formally referred the situation on 19 April 2004 and requested the ICC Prosecutor 
investigate if crimes under the court's jurisdiction were committed anywhere in the 
                                                 
89
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) Article 14.  
90
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) Article 13 (b).  
91
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) Article 14.  
92
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) Article 15 sets out the procedure to be followed by 
the prosecutor when initiating investigations on his/her own motion where the prosecutor believes crimes 
under the court‟s jurisdiction have been committed.  
93
 Ibid 58. 
32 
 
territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo since the entry into force of the Rome 
Statute, on 1 July 2002. The Central African Republic submitted the third referral to the 
Prosecutor by a state party. The referral was made on 22 December 2004. More recent is 
the referral by Mali whose request was made in July 2012. Mali requested the court to 
open investigations into the northern Mali conflict that occurred in early 2012.94   
 
Two of the other cases were referrals to the ICC by the UN Security Council, in 2005 the 
United Nations Security Council95 in acknowledgement of the atrocities that were being 
committed in the Dafur region of Sudan referred the matter to the ICC asking the court to 
investigate and if possible prosecute the perpetrators of the violence.  On 26th February 
2011, the UN Security Council unanimously agreed to refer the Libya situation to the 
ICC.96 
 
Sudan and Libya are not state parties to the Rome Statute and therefore the application 
of the statute to these countries would only have to be through a United Nations 
intervention under whose jurisdiction these countries has ascribed to. The Rome Statute 
gave this additional jurisdiction to the UNSC in acknowledgement of the gravity of the 
offences the court would deal with and the fact that some nations would refuse to ratify 
the Statute and continue committing serious crimes territorially or extra territorially and 
this would therefore be an avenue to deter even those that did not fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Rome Statute and in essence rid the world of the perpetration of the 
serious crimes. 
 
With respect to Kenya and Cote d‟Ivoire the prosecutor exercised his proprio motu 
powers under the Rome Statute97 which gives him the right to initiate investigations in a 
particular country after or during conflict. The prosecutor however is required by the 
statute to seek the permission of the court before proceeding to open investigations and 
prosecutions. The Statute requires the prosecutor to provide evidence before the pre-trial 
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chamber of the court showing there is a reasonable basis to open investigations and 
prosecutions in a particular conflict situation. The pre-trial chamber after analyzing the 
evidence presented before it by the prosecutor can authorize or decline to authorize the 
prosecutor to open investigations in the particular situation.98 In 2009 the prosecutor 
applied his proprio motu powers by requesting the Court to allow him to open 
investigations in Kenya in relation to the post election violence conflict that had occurred 
from December 2007 and spilled over to early 2008. In June 2011, the prosecutor applied 
his proprio motu powers for a second time and asked the court to allow him to open 
investigations in Cote d‟Ivoire in relation to the crimes committed after the election in that 
country. 
 
To date the ICC has indicted thirty six individuals in the eight situations opened for 
investigations. Of the thirty six two are current sitting heads of State, President Omar Al 
Bashir who was indicted while still in office and President Uhuru Kenyatta who was 
elected despite being indicted by the ICC, others are the immediate former president of 
Cote d‟Ivoire Laurent Gbagbo and the late president of Libya President Muammar 
Gaddafi who passed away in October 2011 forcing the proceedings against him to be 
terminated. The court also recently concluded its first case99 where the accused person 
Lubanga was found guilty and was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment.100  
 
The ICC has not operated without its challenges and one of the key challenges has been 
the lack of sufficient capacity to pursue even more perpetrators and the perception that it 
only targets Africans since all its active cases are from Africa. The prosecutorial strategy 
of the court has also been questioned as some investigations have taken a short time 
before prosecutions are opened while others have had inordinate delays that go 
unexplained or sometimes the explanations are not satisfactory. If it is to be effective in 
its fight against impunity these are challenges the court will have to address and 
overcome. 
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3. 3 Truth commissions 
 
It is increasingly common for countries emerging from civil war or authoritarian rule to 
create a truth commission to operate during the immediate post conflict transition 
period.101 They are considered to offer one of the best mechanisms for transitional justice 
and state reconstruction.102 
 
Truth commissions are instruments established to ascertain the truth in post conflict 
societies. They investigate the pattern of abuses committed in the past and then make 
recommendations. Truth commissions vary in their philosophies, missions, compositions, 
procedures, results and successes, as such there is no single broadly accepted definition 
of what constitutes a truth commission.103  
 
Priscilla Hayner, an expert in transitional justice seeks to consolidate different definitions 
of truth commissions and delineates five main characteristics of a truth commission: 
First it focuses on the past, rather than ongoing events. Secondly it investigates a pattern 
of events that took place over a period of time. Thirdly, it engages directly and broadly 
with the affected population, gathering information on their experiences. Fourthly, it‟s a 
temporary body with the aim of concluding with a final report and lastly it is officially 
authorized and empowered by the state under review.104 
 
In addition truth commissions are based in the countries within which they conduct the 
fact finding missions and can be distinguished from other government commissioned 
inquiries that aim to clarify the facts of a particular narrow event.  
 
The truth commissions may have a justice element where they are either empowered to 
initiate prosecutions for those they find culpable for crimes or recommend prosecution to 
another institution mandated to prosecute. In other circumstances the truth commission 
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may not pursue a justice agenda and maybe just focused at establishing the truth and 
reconciling communities.105  
 
While truth commissions do not replace the need for prosecutions, they do offer some 
form of accounting for the past atrocities, and have thus been of particular interest in 
situations where prosecutions for massive crimes are impossible or unlikely, owing to the 
lack of capacity of the judicial system106 or where impunity has been perpetuated over 
decades by different regimes. Where they execute their mandate effectively, they are 
usually able to outline the full responsibility of the state and its various institutions that 
carried out or condoned repressive policies.  
 
Most truth commission‟s focus on victims usually collecting thousands of testimonies, and 
honouring these in a public and officially sanctioned report and this represents for many 
the first acknowledgement by any state body that the victim‟s claims are credible and that 
the atrocities were wrong.107 
 
Since truth commissions usually do not have a prosecutorial mandate, they mainly serve 
the purpose of unmasking the truth and thus through the acknowledgement that the 
crimes were violated and the victims in some instances begin the journey of healing and 
closure. But it is important to note that the perpetrators of abuses do not always 
acknowledge their role in the commission  such circumstances it becomes difficult for the 
commission to promote healing since the truth is not acknowledged by the perpetrators 
and victims are often left feeling bitter.  
 
Some truth commissions also have had a linkage to other justice mechanisms. In such 
circumstances the truth commissions are empowered to analyse and make 
recommendations on the prosecutions of human rights violators. In some instances the 
commission is also empowered to make recommendations to the prosecutorial body for 
amnesty to be offered to some of the violators.  
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In the recent past countries establishing truth commissions have tended to establish such 
commissions through the enactment of legislation that sets out the commission‟s 
mandate, composition and time frame for operation. In most situations truth commissions 
are not established as exclusive entities, they are usually established to complement 
other accountability mechanisms such as prosecutions even though the truth 
commissions operate as independent entities and their outcomes may or may not 
influence other existing accountability mechanisms. 
 
In the recent years Africa has established various truth commissions in an effort to deal 
with the after math of conflict, the South African truth and reconciliation commission108 
being the blue print used to establish subsequent commissions by other countries. Other 
countries who have established such commissions have been Liberia, Kenya and more 
recently Cote d‟Ivoire. The role some of these commissions have played will be analysed 
in more detail in the subsequent chapter that covers case studies by select African 
countries in dealing with post conflict accountability.  
 
3. 4 Institutional reforms 
 
The scope of post conflict or transitional justice goes well beyond the changing of 
regimes or governments. Any state or society seeking to move away from a difficult and 
troubled past and start afresh must undertake significant reforms of its governance, public 
service, administrative and judicial structures. This means initiating measures that would 
promote far-reaching economic, social and political development aimed at constantly 
improving the well-being of the citizens and the state.109  
 
Most societies that have been through conflict or illegitimate rule also endured gross 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, impunity and corruption. Such 
societies must confront their troubled pasts and seek to renew the citizens‟ trust in the 
institutions of governance and public service. These institutions need to be rehabilitated if 
there is to be a break-away from past practices towards a new order of good governance. 
The transformation and improvement of these institutions through wide reaching reforms 
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therefore becomes one of the key cornerstones of an effective transitional justice 
process.  
 
Some of the reforms that are usually embarked on are‟ constitutional reforms, police 
reforms, judicial reforms, legislative and land reforms, governance and administrative 
reforms amongst others.  
 
3. 4. 1 Constitutional reforms 
 
Constitutional reforms when emerging from a repressive rule have become a common 
starting place. Usually countries that emerge from conflict will have repressive 
constitutions that have been amended over time in order to fit into the parameters set by 
the authoritarian regime. Several African countries have in setting their post conflict 
agenda set out to overhaul their constitutions in order to usher in a new constitutional 
order to govern their new dispensation.110 A good example of this is South Africa, who 
adopted a new constitution after the apartheid era was over and more recently Kenya 
which promulgated new constitution in 2010 as part of its post conflict justice agenda 
after the 2007 post election violence.  
 
3. 4. 2 Judicial and police reforms 
 
Some of the conflicts in Africa have been caused due to a lack of confidence in the 
institutions that are supposed to ensure the upholding of the rule of law such as the 
judiciary. It therefore becomes necessary under a new rule of law order to reform the 
judiciary in order to restore public confidence in it as the primary arbiter of disputes. 
 
The security sector is also often compromised during conflict, it therefore follows that this 
institution must also be reformed after conflict to ensure security is restored and the 
public becomes confident with the institution‟s ability to protect them.   
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3. 4. 3 Legislative reforms 
In some instances it is also necessary to undertake legislative reforms that firm up the 
changes under a new order. Some of these laws are also meant to consolidate the 
changes made through the adoption of a new constitution.  
 
3. 4. 4 Land reform 
 
Land is an important resource in Africa and as a result of its scarcity has become one of 
the main sources of conflict in certain countries. Where such countries experience 
massive conflict and emerge from it then land reform becomes an integral part of the 
reform agenda of such a country in order to curb a recurrence of the conflict.   
 
Conclusion 
A variety of options exist for the pursuit of post conflict justice and it is incumbent upon 
the country emerging from a conflict to assess and see which mechanism(s) suit its 
situation best and then adopt these mechanisms. Unfortunately in the recent past, post 
conflict countries have tended to hurriedly adopt mechanisms that have been used by 
other countries in Africa without regard as to the peculiar circumstances that led to the 
adaptation of such a mechanism. The result of this has been partial success from the 
justice mechanisms adopted. The next chapter reviews the impact of post conflict 
accountability mechanisms adopted by select African countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
Chapter 4 
 
4 Transitioning from conflict: Experiences South Africa and Kenya 
 
There is disagreement over whether political transitions genuinely require a unique type 
of justice - one that emphasizes reconciliation as opposed to strict retributive justice, or 
whether transitional justice results from a mere political compromise in which justice 
becomes the casualty of a political calculation. There are practical concerns that require 
attention, including determination of what the ideal balances between trials and truth 
commissions, domestic and international initiatives, efficiency and effectiveness are.111 
 
One fundamental question to ask is, under what conditions should a society turn to trials, 
or truth commissions, or both? Luckily certain African post conflict states have tested the 
different approaches with varying degrees of success. This chapter will seek to evaluate 
the experiences of two African post conflict states: South Africa and Kenya in an attempt 
to examine the successes of the approaches adopted in their transition from conflict 
where serious violations of human rights were committed. 
 
4. 1The case study of South Africa  
 
The experience of South Africa in dealing with past atrocities committed during the 
apartheid era as the country transitioned into a democratic society is one that has created 
a reference point for many other post conflict societies.  
 
4. 1. 1 History of the conflict  
 
The word apartheid meaning „apartness‟ or „separation‟ in Afrikaners was the basis upon 
which the state had discriminated against part of its population for many years. However, 
segregation had been a fact in South Africa‟s life long before the Afrikaans took power. 
From the day when the sailor Jan Van Riebeeck found a victualing station at the Cape in 
1652, blacks and whites lived separately. But when radical Afrikaner nationalists 
triumphed in the 1948 elections, they created a vast legal super structure to enforce 
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separation.112 Apartheid therefore refers to a system of racial discrimination and white 
political domination adopted by South Africa‟s National Party while in power from 1948 to 
1994. 
 
Apartheid was proposed as an alternative practice of colonialism which was distinctly 
characterized by master-servant relations resulting in some locals being considered to be 
lower castes being ruled and exploited economically. The colonial relation was 
considered to be more of a top down relationship. Apartheid on the other hand as 
proposed, was supposed to separate people vertically rather than horizontally as the 
colonial model of white supremacy was structured. Apartheid was proposed by the 
National Party government as a “rational” alternative because it involved separating 
ethnic groups so that each could be developed separately in its own cultural space. This 
model was therefore presented as a model that would end the white supremacy structure, 
so that each group would be free from the dominion of others and hence able to develop 
in its own way. The practice of apartheid never matched this theory, but the theory 
provided Afrikaners with a way to rationalize and justify repressive actions by referring to 
an “ideal” future state.113 
 
In 1948 various legislations were introduced that controlled the quality and nature of life 
of every white, African, coloured, and Indian South African from the cradle to the grave.114 
From when the policies were adopted, apartheid governed every aspect of national life. It 
assigned every baby from birth to a „rigid population‟ group which determined where he or 
she could live, go to school, what lavatory to use, who they could marry.115 
 
Apartheid persisted in South Africa from 1948 to 1994. Political rights to vote and hold 
office were reserved for whites only. The apartheid system rested on four basic 
principles.  
1. There were four official racial groups identified as, White, African, Coloured and 
Indian.  
2. Whites regarded as the only civilized race and therefore exercised political power 
over the other racial groups.  
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3. White interests always came before black interests.  
4. All whites no matter what their European origins were considered white.116 
 
The Africans did not embrace apartheid and in an effort to fight the segregation liberation 
movements emerged and over the years became more structured. Organised protest 
against apartheid grew in the 1960‟s and 1970‟s and became much stronger in the 1980‟s 
when social movements in South Africa took the protests to the streets and the armed 
liberation movement the African National Congress (ANC) had built strong regional and 
international support against apartheid.117  
 
The armed liberation saw many Africans killed and others arrested and detained. Nelson 
Mandela was arrested for leading the liberation movement in 1962. He was tried and 
sentenced to life imprisonment. He served for 27 years in prison.118 Eventually, the 
apartheid regime begun to respond to the liberation with a mix of modest reforms while at 
the same time continuing the violent attacks on the liberation movements.119 The ANC 
and other liberation movements were not relenting however, despite the small gestures 
through reforms by the National Party.  
 
1989 formed the turning point for South Africa, when President de Clarke took over the 
leadership of South Africa. Known for his reform mindset in other leadership positions he 
had held before. From the onset of his assumption to power he made it clear he would 
continue with previous talks that had begun the journey toward racial peace and work 
towards building a more united country and he was not supportive of the apartheid 
discriminatory practices.  In 1990, he lifted the ban on the ANC and other anti-apartheid 
movements and released Mandela the ANC leader who for the 27 years of imprisonment 
had become the symbol of black South African‟s struggle for political rights.120 Eventually 
De Clarke opened up negotiations for the end of apartheid between the National Party, 
government and the ANC together with other smaller liberation movements.  
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4. 1. 2 Transition negotiations  
 
The transition negotiations from apartheid regime to democracy begun in 1990 and 
ended up in the adoption of the interim constitution in 1993. The negotiations were not 
without their own challenges. The ANC sought to transfer power to the majority hence to 
blacks, but above all to itself. The national party government remained determined to 
engineer a complicated political system in which power of the majority in the end would 
not be any greater than that of the minorities, particularly that of the country‟s white 
leaders. When the first phase of the transition process was over, it ended with no 
progress towards narrowing the two positions.121 
 
During the negotiations the country had to deal with a significant issue many post conflict 
states have had to deal with on how to induce different groups to peacefully coexist after 
years of conflict. A discussion led by the group that was taking over the leadership of the 
country was of the opinion that some reckoning with the past was necessary in order for 
former opponents to look to a peaceful shared future. This reckoning according to them 
would come in the form of prosecutions for past atrocities. The former apartheid 
government, the other party to the negotiations was however opposed and wanted the 
country to just forget and forge on.122  
 
In 1993 when all the divisive issues were resolved and the interim constitution was 
agreed on the question of whether to grant amnesty to the perpetrators of past atrocities 
was still outstanding. The National Party desperately wanted amnesty more than the 
liberation movement which had also been accused of committing atrocities and was 
considered to be in a better position legally because of earlier enactment of indemnity 
legislations. Top ANC negotiators are accused of secretly agreeing to the drafting of a 
post script to the constitution which would contain an amnesty clause by the National 
Party negotiators. This occurred in a hiatus period between the end of formal 
constitutional talks and the constitution going to parliament in December 1994. The 
justification given by ANC leadership on the concession and clandestine manner in which 
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the post script on amnesty was included was that the constitution would not have been 
passed.123 
 
Indeed, the wording of the Constitution‟s post-amble was deliberately vague, in effect, 
leaving it up to a subsequent political process to work out the detail. Although the 
undertaking to indemnify perpetrators was a bitter pill to swallow, especially for those 
within the anti-apartheid movement, most commentators agree that momentum towards 
transition would have been fundamentally undermined without it.124 
 
After negotiations and an intense public relations campaign, the ANC indicated that it 
understood the need for a general amnesty for some who may have been in a position to 
obstruct the transition process.  The struggle during the negotiations to define political 
offenses, the resulting indemnity process was arbitrary and very confusing for the 
citizenry. This cast a pall over the negotiation process as many South Africans were left 
feeling suspicious and angry.125 
 
In the end the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was the avenue chosen was 
to be enforced during the transition period. The South African TRC model sought to put 
together a commission which would replicate the positive aspects of the earlier 
commissions while avoiding some of their pitfalls. Thus it would appear that South Africa 
had chosen the middle path, the pragmatic approach, utilizing the truth commission and 
amnesty approach.126 
 
The constitution‟s post-script was titled, „national unity and reconciliation‟. It explicitly 
rejected retribution and called on past injustices to be addressed on the basis that there 
is a need to be understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for 
retaliation. The TRC adopted a motto of reconciliation through truth and not as had been 
characteristic of past reconciliation efforts in the country, which was through indemnity.127 
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4. 1. 3 The truth and reconciliation commission  
 
One key goal of the TRC process was the establishment of a human rights culture in 
South Africa. The emphasis of the commission was on gathering evidence and 
uncovering information, from both victims and perpetrators and not prosecuting 
individuals for past crimes which is how the commission mainly differed from other past 
tribunals that prosecuted the perpetrators of the crimes committed during conflict.128 
 
(i) The mandate 
 
Established in 1995,129 the TRC was charged with investigating gross human rights 
abuses that occurred between 1960 and 1994 so as to create as complete an accounting 
as possible of the atrocities of that period. Perpetrators were offered amnesty in 
exchange for full disclosure about their past crimes.  
 
(ii) The commissioners  
 
Seventeen commissioners were appointed to serve in the commission and it was headed 
by Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Bishop Tutu is credited for the profile he gave the 
commission and his dedication to ensuring the reconciliation approach, adopted in setting 
up the TRC was embraced by South Africans. 
 
(iii) The hearings 
 
The commission undertook its work through committees. Through the committees the 
commission held both open and closed hearing sessions to collect the information under 
its mandate. The three committees established to facilitate its work were: 
 
(a) The human rights violations committee investigated human rights abuses that 
occurred between 1960 and 1994. 
(b) The reparation and rehabilitation committee was charged with restoring victims' 
dignity and formulating proposals to assist with rehabilitation. 
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(c) The amnesty committee considered applications from individuals who applied for 
amnesty in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 
 
The commission conducted its hearings throughout the country over a period of eighteen 
months and the Commission received more than 15,000 statements from victims and 
hundreds of witnesses came forth to testify.130 
 
The amnesty committee held hearings for those who admitted having committed crimes. 
For the amnesty hearings, the criteria for granting amnesty was that the individual should 
have perpetrated violations during the apartheid era and the violations needed to be 
politically and proportionate. The individual was also required to make full disclosure 
when seeking amnesty. Slightly over 7,000 people applied for amnesty. However, many 
were common criminals hoping to convince the commissioners that they had political, not 
criminal motives, and only a few were top leaders of the apartheid system. Nearly half of 
the applicants were from the African National Congress. Contrition was not a requirement 
for amnesty, and indeed many applicants did not apologize for their actions. In the end, 
amnesty was granted to approximately 16% of the applicants. Thus, out of a population of 
43 million people, only about one thousand individuals acknowledged their responsibility 
for apartheid‟s crimes, receiving amnesty and reintegration back into society.131 
 
The commission recorded over 30,000 violations, but only a small percentage of these 
matters were addressed through the amnesty process. Despite many important 
revelations, it is evident that many, if not most apartheid era torturers and killers - from all 
sides of the conflict, did not come clean for one reason or another.132 
 
In the performance rating of the TRC many believed that the amnesty provision was key 
without which a relatively peaceful settlement would not have been possible. Thus, the 
end of apartheid possibly prevented future human rights abuses.133 
 
The TRC forwarded a list of 800 of its cases to the National Prosecuting Authority, which 
they felt required further investigation and consideration for prosecution. These and other 
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outstanding matters relating to past violations, prompted, primarily behind the scenes 
discussions between government and some of the interested parties about how to 
proceed. The public remained largely in the dark about these developments, but 
periodically the media reported on prospective deals between apartheid era security force 
chiefs and the ANC134 during Tambo Mbeki‟s reign. More latitude was again offered with 
respect to the pursuit of justice for the crimes committed during the apartheid era.  
 
South Africa‟s version of restorative justice emphasized reconciliation between 
perpetrators and victims, built ideally on a perpetrator‟s repentance and a victim‟s 
forgiveness. Ultimately, it was hoped, the South African nation as a whole would likewise 
become reconciled.135 
 
The commission released its first five volumes of its final report on Oct. 29 1998,136 and 
the remaining two volumes of the report in March 21, 2003.137 
 
(iv)  Reparations 
 
Although the TRC report recommendations were detailed in the volumes of the final 
report released in 1998, government insisted that no reparations policy could be adopted 
until the final volumes of the report were completed in 2003; this meant a seven year 
delay for victims since the TRC process begun. The Reparation and Rehabilitation 
Committee (RRC) of the TRC then prepared a reparations policy. The RRC 
recommendations covered five key areas, namely: interim reparation, individual 
reparation grants (IRG), symbolic reparation, legal and administrative measure, and 
institutional reform. The committee also recommended that the policy implementation be 
development centered, simple, efficient and fair, culturally appropriate, and community-
based.138 
 
After the policy was completed responsibility lay with the government to implement it or 
not. The performance by the government on this front has been inadequate; even urgent 
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interim-reparations took more than two and a half years to be granted. To date only a 
handful of victims and survivors have accessed the government reparations.139 
 
The reparations process over the past decade has been characterized by some as a 
missed opportunity for targeted poverty alleviation and individual reconciliation. 
International experience is testament to the fact that victims of past violence are unlikely 
to forgive or find a sense of closure as long as they continue to suffer the consequences 
of the injury.  In South Africa this would require addressing both individual needs as well 
as the broader socio-economic context.  
 
(v) Mixed reactions on the success of the commission 
 
With the exception of a relatively small minority of supporters, the TRC and its 
subsequent report have been widely criticized. Many in both the former ruling white elite 
as well as the zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party called the TRC a witch hunt. Many of 
apartheid‟s victims believe the process failed them by both granting amnesties and failing 
to pay reparations. The minority of TRC supporters, led by Desmond Tutu, former 
chairperson of the TRC, argue that the process has been both healing and necessary for 
the future of a South African society based on human rights.140 
 
Mamdani argues that the TRC resulted in an institutionally produced truth, as the 
outcome of a process of truth seeking, one whose boundaries were so narrowly defined 
by power and whose search was so committed to reinforcing the new power, that it 
turned the political boundaries of a compromise into analytical boundaries of truth 
seeking.141 
 
It has also been argued that such an amnesty arrangement can only be entered into by 
victims themselves or their legitimate representatives and not by others on their behalf 
with very little consultation.  
 
A few issues still linger from the South African experience, in promising amnesty to 
apartheid killers, did the ANC choose a more comfortable political expedient and found a 
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new democracy on a flawed judicial response to a systemic crime against humanity? Did 
the government compromise justice in its effort to provide an interpretation of apartheid 
crimes that would facilitate reconciliation among the races? If so, is this a failure of 
transitional justice or strength of such a response to atrocities?142 
 
Valdez, suggests that a state which wishes to deal with its authoritarian past must include 
four components in its efforts: to investigate and make the facts known (truth); to put on 
trial and punish the guilty (justice); to redress the moral and physical damage caused 
(reparation); and to eradicate from the security forces those known to have committed, 
ordered or tolerated the commission of abuses.  South Africa was somewhat successful 
at achieving truth, but much less successful at the other three components.143 
 
But even with the criticism, still, anecdotal evidence suggests that for many who 
addressed the commission, the value of telling one‟s story before a supportive audience 
was significant. Referring to the psychological value of testifying, one witness said: 
“When the officer tortured me at that time in John Vorster Square, he laughed at me: „You 
can scream your head off, nobody will ever hear you!‟ He was wrong. Today there are 
people who will hear me.”144 
 
4. 2  The case study of Kenya  
 
4. 2. 1 Historical context 
  
On 27 December 2007, approximately ten million Kenyans went to poll in what was 
generally anticipated to be the most hotly contested and close-run presidential, 
parliamentary and civic general elections in the country‟s post-independence period.145 At 
the time of going to the elections there were two dominant political parties in the race, the 
Party of National Unity headed by the incumbent President Mwai Kibaki and the Orange 
Democratic Party headed by Raila Odinga.146 
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The Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) and other governance institutions are 
adjudged as having mismanaged the electoral process resulting in an unsatisfactory 
result for many Kenyans. The failure to deliver a satisfactory election is credited for the 
resultant eruption of violence. In this ensuing period of approximately one and a half 
months, Kenya witnessed unprecedented waves of violence that The nature of crimes 
comprised of destructive, deadly, and widespread violent attacks which were 
characterized by sexual violence, maiming, and killing that caused the death, 
displacement and the burning and destruction of property. The commission of inquiry into 
the post-election violence estimated that the violence resulted in over 1,500 deaths, 
3,000 rapes, and 300,000 people were left internally displaced.147 
 
The doctoring of election results in favour of particular candidates was not new in Kenya. 
In fact it had become more of the norm in almost every election. The only recourse to 
those who were aggrieved was to petition the court to reverse the results. Often the court 
petitions would drag on for years and the verdicts in most instances were not considered 
fair. Public faith in the judiciary as a fair arbiter in cases brought before it had waned over 
the years.148 
 
Violence had also been a part of Kenya's electoral processes since the restoration of 
multi-party politics in 1991. However, the violence that shook Kenya after the 2007 
general elections was unprecedented. It was by far the most deadly and the most 
destructive violence ever experienced in Kenya. Also, unlike previous cycles of election 
related violence, much of it followed, rather than preceded elections. The 2007-2008 
post-election violence was also more widespread than in the past. It engulfed six out of 
Kenya‟s eight provinces and was felt in both urban and rural parts of the country. 
Previously violence around election periods concentrated in a smaller number of districts 
mainly in Rift Valley, Western, and Coast Provinces.149 
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The CIPEV commission further found that state security agencies had failed institutionally 
to anticipate, prepare for, and contain the violence and some individual members of the 
state security agencies were also guilty of acts of violence and gross violations of the 
human rights of the citizens.150 
 
The violence threatened to overrun the existence of political, social, structural institutions 
and launch Kenya into civil war or at the very least a bloody and catastrophic 
humanitarian crisis. The post-election events of 2007 led to the intervention of the 
international community and particularly the African Union. 
 
4. 2. 2 The negotiation to end the conflict  
 
On the 28th of January 2008 in a bid to reconcile warring factions His Excellency Hon. 
John Kuffour the then Chairman of the African Union, and then president of Ghana flew 
into Nairobi to negotiate with the two leaders. As a follow up action to his efforts, H.E. J. 
Kuffour, with agreement of President Mwai Kibaki, and Hon. Raila Odinga, constituted a 
panel of eminent personalities led by Dr. Kofi Annan the former United Nations secretary 
general, to mediate over the crisis. The two political protagonists sent representatives to 
a mediation panel which came to be known as the Kenya National Dialogue and 
Reconciliation panel.151  
 
On 28 February, 2008 the parties, the Party of National Unity (PNU) led by President 
Mwai Kibaki and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) led by Hon. Raila Odinga 
signed the agreement on principles of partnership of the coalition government152 which 
was to be implemented under the Kenya national dialogue and reconciliation (KNDR) 
framework.  
 
In the framework of the KNDR the parties agreed to enact the National Accord and 
Reconciliation Act 2008 to end the political crisis. The national accord formed the basis 
for power sharing and for moving the country out of the crisis.  As part of the negotiated 
agreement, four main agenda items were agreed. These were: 
                                                 
150
 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV), Kenya (2008) vii. 
151
 Wachira, Arendshorst and Charles Citizens In Action Making Peace in the Post Election Crisis in Kenya -
2008 (2010) xvii.  
152
 Full text of the agreement can be accessed at http://rescuekenya.files.wordpress.com/2008/03/annan-
mediated-agreement-v-2-3.pdf. 
51 
 
(a) Agenda Item one: Focused on stopping the violence. 
(b) Agenda Item two: Addressed the Humanitarian Crisis and Promoted Healing and 
Reconciliation. 
(c) Agenda Item three: Dealt with overcoming Political Crisis (power sharing). 
(d) Agenda Item four: Tackled long-term issues to be undertaken to ensure sustainable 
peace. 
 
More specifically, the mediation exercise agreed to the formation of two commissions as 
part of the Agenda four: 
(a) The first bearing the mandate to inquire into the conduct of the 2007 presidential 
elections. 
(b)  The second to inquire into the post-election violence following the announcement of 
the said elections. 
  
These two teams came to be known as the Independent Review Commission (IREC) 
unofficially referred to as the Krieger Commission and the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) unofficially referred to as the Waki Commission.153 
 
4. 2. 3 The commission of inquiry into the post-election violence  
 
The Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV) mandate included: 
a) Investigation into the facts and circumstances related to the post-election violence. 
b) Investigation the actions or omissions of state security agencies. 
c) Making recommendations to prevent a repetition of electoral violence in future. 
d) Recommending measures to promote national reconciliation in Kenya. 
e) Recommending legal, political and administrative measures to address issues of 
violence. 
 
CIPEV released its report in October 2008. One of the main recommendations was the 
establishment of a special tribunal in Kenya to assist in dealing with perpetrators of post-
election violence within sixty days of the release of the report.154 Such a mechanism that 
would constitute both local and foreign staff was recommended given that many Kenyans 
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lacked of confidence in the local judicial system which had been cited as inefficient, 
partisan and rife with corruption.  This could be characterized by a common saying 
among Kenyans that read “why hire a lawyer when you can buy a judge”. There was lack 
of confidence in the judicial system particularly its ability to prosecute senior political and 
government officials for crimes committed during the post-election period.  
 
Furthermore, at the time CIPEV was conducting its investigations, the police and the 
office of the attorney general had been lax in instituting prosecutions against the 
perpetrators.155 It was also considered that the police could not be trusted to conduct 
impartial and independent investigations due to possible political interference and the fact 
that many state security agencies had been implicated by CIPEV.156 
 
On the 17th October 2008, the CIPEV report was handed over to former UN secretary 
general Kofi Annan starting the 60 day countdown to establish a justice mechanism to 
adjudicate the post-election violence crimes. With the report Annan was also handed a 
sealed envelope with names of persons singled out by the commission as possibly 
bearing the greatest responsibility for the post poll chaos. The commission instructed Dr. 
Annan to handover the said names to the ICC if there was failure by government to set 
up a special tribunal.157 
 
In 2009 bills for the establishment of the special tribunal for Kenya were tabled in 
Parliament on three different occasions but failed to be passed. The contentious grounds 
for rejecting the draft laws were that the laws contained clauses that would strip 
presidential immunity from prosecution; presidential powers to pardon convicted 
suspects; and the removal of the attorney general‟s power to enter a Nolle Prosequi in 
tribunal proceedings. The sixty day deadline lapsed with the government of Kenya 
seeking extensions from Kofi Annan twice.158   
 
Despite intensive lobbying, the members of parliament were categorical that they did not 
want a special court set out to deal with the cases, indeed in one of the parliamentary 
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sessions they devised a now popular phrase “let‟s not be vague, let‟s go to the Hague”  in 
reference to the possibility of an ICC intervention.  
 
Kenya signed and later ratified the Rome Statue of the ICC in 2005. This means that 
without any further action on the part of Kenyan authorities or any international actor, the 
ICC prosecutor may choose to seek to open an investigation into genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and or war crimes that have been committed in Kenya or by Kenyan 
nationals. In order to determine whether to seek to open an investigation, however, the 
ICC prosecutor must first carry out an analysis of whether alleged crimes fall within the 
court's jurisdiction and whether any case based on these crimes would be admissible.159 
 
From the outset, the special tribunal‟s promoters, including the commission, saw the 
special tribunal as one way to strengthen domestic justice in Kenya. The ultimate aim of 
establishing the tribunal was to dispense justice in compliance with the principle of 
complementarity enshrined in article 17(3) of the Rome Statute. 
 
The concept of complementarity entails that the ICC can gain jurisdiction only when 
domestic legal systems are unwilling or genuinely unable to carry out an investigation or 
prosecution of an accused individual. Therefore, the ICC gives preference to domestic 
courts if they are capable of conducting fair trials and hence, the ICC assigns primary 
responsibility for the enforcement of the prohibition of genocide, crimes of aggression 
crimes against humanity and war crimes to national criminal jurisdictions, within certain 
prescribed minimum standard parameters.160 
 
4. 2. 4 The ICC intervention  
 
On 9 July 2009, the African Union panel of eminent African personalities, chaired by Kofi 
Annan, announced its submission to the ICC prosecutor of a sealed envelope containing 
a list of persons allegedly implicated and supporting materials previously entrusted to Mr. 
Annan by the commission of inquiry on the post-election violence. On 16 July 2009, 
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Prosecutor received the sealed envelope and six boxes containing documents and 
supporting material compiled by the commission.161 
 
In October 2009, the prosecutor sent a letter to Kenyan authorities explaining that the 
preliminary examination of the crimes committed in the context of post-election violence 
in Kenya had revealed that acts constituting crimes against humanity might have been 
committed, that there are no relevant national judicial enquiries and the gravity threshold 
established by the Statute was reached. The letter explained that there were two options 
for initiating an investigation, namely a referral from the Kenyan government or an 
independent decision of the prosecutor to request authorization from the pre-trial 
chamber to start an investigation.162 
 
In a subsequent meeting with the President and Prime Minister, they indicated that the 
government was not willing to refer the situation but would cooperate with the court if the 
prosecutor initiated the process for investigations though his own motion. The prosecutor 
then approached the pre-trial chamber seeking an authorization to open investigations in 
Kenya.  
 
 The 15 December 2010, the ICC prosecutor, revealed the names of the six individuals 
suspected to be the most responsible for the post-election violence (PEV). Five of the 
individuals were senior politicians and high ranking government officials drawn from both 
sides of the coalition government. The sixth one was a prominent journalist.163 The 
prosecutor then approached the ICC pre-trial chamber (PTC) with substantive evidence 
linking the six individuals to the post election violence crimes. He filed two applications 
before the PTC requesting that the court finds that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the suspects committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC and issues 
summons for their appearance at the court.164 
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This marked the turning point for the Kenya government support for the ICC cases. The 
government has frustrated efforts to bring accountability by the ICC and the ICC 
prosecutor is on record accusing the Kenya government as not being cooperative in 
facilitating investigations and prosecutions. 
 
Thereafter, on 8th March 2011, the PTC rendered its decision on the prosecutor‟s 
applications where the PTC summoned the suspects to appear before the court, at 
different times, on 7 April 2011.165 One of the main reasons given by the ICC pre-trial 
chamber in its decision to authorize the office of the prosecutor to investigate possible 
crimes against humanity in Kenya was anchored in article 17 (1) of the Rome Statute, 
that the Kenyan government had not commenced investigations on those bearing the 
greatest responsibility for the international crimes. This was evidenced by the inactivity on 
the part of the investigating and prosecutorial agencies in dealing with post election 
violence cases. 
 
In the two cases, charges against four individuals were confirmed by the pre-trial 
chamber, but the prosecution eventually withdrew the charges against Francis Muthaura 
in March 2013, citing the withdrawal and death of crucial witnesses to support the 
prosecution‟s evidence.166 The cases are now at the trial stage with the case against 
William Ruto and Joshua Sang167 having commenced on 10th September 2013 and that of 
Uhuru Kenyatta168 now scheduled to begin in February 2014 after its November 
commencement date was recently postponed.  
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4. 2. 5 National prosecutions 
  
National authorities, have the primary responsibility to bring those responsible for 
international crimes to account. Providing judicial remedies to victims and administering 
criminal justice fairly are core aspects of good governance and help to build respect for 
the rule of law and to deter future crimes. The ICC's authority to act only where national 
authorities are unable or unwilling, thereby respecting the role of national courts and 
encourages the development of credible and independent judicial systems within national 
jurisdictions.169 
 
The ICC prosecutor can only target only those persons bearing the greatest responsibility 
for the gravest crimes170 and therefore with the current situation where the government 
has not pursued other perpetrators a huge impunity gap exists.  
 
The government and specifically the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions has 
taken very minimal action to indicate commitment to prosecute post election offenders 
particularly those bearing the greatest responsibility for the violence. 171 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the 2007-2008 election violence the government seemed 
willing to explore paths toward accountability. Indeed, there was tremendous pressure 
from the Kenyan population to do so, leading, ironically, to slapdash investigations and 
prosecutions that were so hurried that they resulted in acquittals.172 
 
In 2011 the Office of the attorney general, through the department of public prosecutions, 
compiled lists of thousands of cases allegedly linked to the election violence, ranging 
from petty theft and rioting to rape and murder. In study conducted by human rights watch 
in 2011, on the level of accountability in Kenya for the post-election violence, it found that 
despite efforts to prioritize and act on serious cases in the immediate aftermath of the 
violence, there had been few prosecutions and fewer convictions, as well as a near total 
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lack of investigations of those who organized and financed the violence. Hundreds of 
inquest files literally gather dust in police stations. 
 
In April 2012, the government of Kenya announced the formation of a multi-agency task 
force with the mandate of reviewing, re-evaluating and re-examining all PEV pending 
investigation, pending trial and concluded cases. In 2012, they reported that 24 post-
election violence suspects had been convicted out of the 6,081 cases presented to the 
task force for review by the police. This is a negligible number considering the wide scale 
of the violence experienced in 2008.173  
 
It remains doubtful that national mechanisms for prosecuting post election violence can 
effectively investigate and prosecute allegations against high level and even low level 
perpetrators.  
 
Most victims with a desire to obtain remedies for the crimes committed against them have 
been forced to organise themselves and approach the courts seeking redress. There are 
several class suits before the high court initiated by various categories of victims of the 
PEV such as, the internally displaced persons and the victims of sexual and gender 
based violence.  
 
 
4. 2. 6 The truth justice and reconciliation commission  
 
In 2003 soon after Kenya transitioned from 24 years under the leadership of President 
Daniel Moi, the new regime appointed a task force on the establishment of a truth, justice, 
and reconciliation commission. The task force was mandated to collect views from 
Kenyans on whether it was necessary to establish a truth justice and reconciliation 
commission. The taskforce in its report indicated that a majority of the Kenyans it sought 
views from indicated they wanted an effective truth, justice, and reconciliation 
commission established immediately to serve as a vehicle that would reveal the truth 
about past atrocities, name perpetrators, provide redress for victims, and promote 
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national healing and reconciliation.174 Unfortunately no steps were taken by the 
government to implement the recommendations of the report and the truth commission 
was never formed. It therefore did not come as a surprise that an official truth-seeking 
process was thought to be necessary following the 2007/2008 post-election violence. The 
truth justice and reconciliation commission was proposed as a mechanism that would 
serve as a measure of transitioning the country from the conflict, healing and reconciling 
the country under the agenda four on long-term issues to be undertaken to ensure 
sustainable peace, of the Kenya national dialogue and reconciliation framework.175 
 
The commission was established by an Act of parliament176 in 2008, although it was 
officially set up in 2009 and was charged with investigating gross human rights violations 
and other historical injustices in Kenya from 12 December 1963 to 28 February 2008. 
 
(i) Mandate 
 
The TJRC's mandate was to establish an accurate and complete historical record of 
these human rights abuses and to ensure justice (criminal, restorative and social) while 
promoting peace and national unity. 
 
(ii) Composition of the commissioners 
 
The TJRC Act provided that the commission would be served by nine commissioners 
three of whom were non-nationals. The hybrid composition of nationals and non-nationals 
was thought necessary when drafting and negotiating the Act to ensure the impartiality of 
the commission and to minimize influence from the influential and political elite.  
 
(iii) The performance of the commission  
 
The commission began its work in August 2009. To fulfill its mandate the TJRC undertook 
several activities such as statement taking, hearings: individual, thematic and institutional, 
and community dialogues. At the onset of its work the commission also undertook civic 
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education and outreach activities across the country to educate the society on the 
commission and its mandate.  
 
During its period of operation the commission collected 42,098 statements and 1,529 
memoranda countrywide. Addressing various violations including extra judicial killings 
persecution, torture, detention, economic crimes among others. The commission in its 
report indicates that part of its success is thatit collected the largest number of statements 
of any truth commission in history. 
 
The truth commission experienced a myriad of internal challenges throughout its 
operations, including serious allegations of conflict of interest with respect to its 
chairperson, Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat.  
 
Soon after the commissioners were appointed and sworn in in 2009, there emerged 
contests from different fronts on the suitability of Amb.Bethuel Kiplagat to chair the 
commission. The opposition of Amb. Kiplagat leading Kenya‟s first attempt at a national 
moral and ethical audit was that he had aided and abetting the very human rights abuses 
that the TJRC sought to investigate.  
 
The TJRC Act stipulates that the commissioners appointed should be of good character 
and integrity and should not have been involved, implicated, linked or associated with 
human rights violations which had the potential of being investigated by the TJRC. 
 
Kiplagat initially decided to fight the possibility of his removal and for several months the 
commission was non-functional. As a result of the stalemate the deputy chairperson 
resigned a few months after the Commission was inaugurated and was never replaced. 
Eventually Kiplagat stepped aside as a tribunal was formed to investigate his suitability to 
continue serving as the chairperson of the commission.  
 
For 16 months, the commission operated without its chairman as he was engaged in 
litigation trying to clear his name of allegations that he was part of the mess he had been 
appointed to investigate. With the absence of the chairman and former deputy, the 
commission operated with only seven full-time commissioners instead of the nine 
stipulated by the Act that created it. Amb. Kiplagat was eventually exonerated by the 
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tribunal and found fit to continue serving as the chairman of the commission. However 
even after his return to the commission he was faced with opposition by the other 
commissioners and he remained a mere figurehead and it was agreed that he did not 
participate in writing the final report. 
 
The success of the commission was further in jeopardy when some organisations 
representing victims of injustices threatened to boycott the hearings if Kiplagat remained 
at its helm. Without people to testify, the Commission‟s work would have been fruitless. 
 
Local and international media largely ignored the Commission‟s hearings and on the few 
occasions when it was given prominent coverage, often had to do with the controversies 
surrounding the commission.  
 
The commission requested for a record three extensions, all were granted thus stretching 
its two and half year mandate into four years. The commission was also not well funded. 
Sometimes it had to beg for finances to keep it barely moving, finances that the 
commission was more than once accused of pilfering. It however  
denied the corruption allegations.177 
 
The truth, justice and reconciliation commission (TJRC) was perhaps the most troubled 
commission in Kenya‟s history, a fact that it acknowledges in its final report. “Some of 
those challenges at times threatened the very existence of the organisation, and took its 
toll on many of us, both physically and emotionally,” the TJRC report reads in part, 
singling out the resignation of its original Vice Chair Betty Murungi, as one of the 
consequences of the challenges.  
 
The truth justice and reconciliation commission Act provides that, the commission shall 
submit a report of its work to the President at the end of its operations. In May 2013 the 
commission submitted its final report to the president. The TJRC Act provides that the 
implementation of its report shall commence within six months of the publication of the 
report of the commission. In the report over 400 individuals are named for their diverse 
roles in the commission of historical abuses and violations in Kenya.  
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A few weeks after the release of the report the international commissioners released their 
own dissent on the chapter on land that was included in the last report released. The 
commissioners indicated that the chapter on land had been amended hurriedly just 
before the release of the final report. The changes highlighted in the dissent were on 
portions of the chapter that had implicated the Kenyatta family in historical injustices 
related to land acquisition. 
 
The TJRC is judged as having failed to galvanise Kenyans to engage in a national debate 
about their history. There were a few discussions in the media following some of the 
hearings, but overall these discussions remained subdued compared to extraneous 
matters such as the litigation against the TJRC Chair. 
 
In Kenya, there has been minimal commitment by the government or the political elite to 
promote healing and reconciliation. As observed earlier, the TJRC's standing and integrity 
have suffered, which makes it difficult to convince Kenyans that it had the will to address 
the legacy of past human rights violations. But even more pressing at the moment is the 
current concerted effort by the government and more specifically the attorney general and 
Parliament to frustrate the implementation of the recommendations of the TJRC. The 
attorney general introduced in parliament a bill seeking to amend the TJRC Act. Parts of 
these amendments were viewed as creating the possibility of Parliament amending the 
report once it is presented before it for adoption. A serious threat was anticipated 
especially in the relation to the over 400 names of persons singled out by the commission 
in its report for their roles in the various historical violations committed in Kenya. In the 
first week of December 2013 the TJRC Act (amendment) bill, was adopted and it is 
anticipated that the members of parliament will seek to alter the report once it is tabled in 
parliament.   
 
It is therefore important to realise that a short-term intervention such as the TJRC is 
limited in effecting broad structural changes in society and remains an insufficient tool to 
heal a country especially where political will is lacking.178 
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Kritz, addresses the question of how to determine when international or national 
mechanisms are required, he indicates that “the best scenario would before the 
international community to provide appropriate assistance to enable a society emerging 
from mass abuse to deal with the issues of justice and accountability itself.” However, 
since local judicial structures are usually decimated or compromised where societies 
have recently experienced widespread abuse, it is often incumbent upon the international 
community to take on the task of accountability for the abuses in question.”179 Kenya‟s 
experience replicates this scenario.  
 
Conclusion  
During the ongoing wave of democratic transformations, one can observe a “paradigm 
shift” in the means by which new leaders address their nations‟ violent past. There is a 
new commitment at both domestic and international levels to bring justice and healing to 
people who have experienced gross human rights atrocities perpetrated by ousted 
regimes or rebel groups. 
 
Because justice is integral to reconciliation, truth commissions that allow impunity for 
perpetrators in the interest of hearing the truth may be flawed. When heinous acts of 
terror or apartheid draw little redress to the offenders and no steps against governments 
that assailed human rights, survivors and their kin can feel ill-used.180 
 
The absence of war does not fully idealize the presence of peace and the vision of full 
reconciliation is far from being realized especially in societies where the political will to 
see through the transition justice mechanisms adopted operate effectively and their 
recommendations are  implemented.  
 
The different experiences illustrated above are evidence that no one size fits all post 
conflict situations and it is incumbent on those that manage the country‟s transition from 
conflict to evaluate the local context and take the most suitable approach. There is also 
evidence that the success of a particular approach does not necessarily mean that it 
would work with similar success in another post conflict situation. Political will to actualize 
the mechanisms adopted is also critical and the success or failure of the mechanism that 
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is adopted largely depends on the commitment by the government to implement it to the 
fullest extent.  
 
The next chapter will examine the role of the African Union in fostering peace and 
security in the continent; with particular focus on the role it has played in supporting 
efforts that seek to fight impunity in the continent. 
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CHAPTER 5 
5 African Union contribution to the fight against impunity in Africa 
 
The OAU member States‟ adoption of the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights 
in 1981 in Nairobi, Kenya, marked a milestone development in terms of human rights 
normative framework of the African continent. Notwithstanding this progressive human 
rights normative framework the continent has continued to witness colossal and grave 
human rights violations especially war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.181 
 
The Constitutive Act of the African Union provides a legal framework for the continental 
body to fight impunity. Article 4(h) and (o) authorize the organization to intervene in 
member states to stop war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and prevent 
impunity. While the adoption of Article 4 (h) and (o) of the Constitutive Act precipitated a 
paradigm shift in Africa from the non-interference doctrine in state affairs to the non-
indifference doctrine in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, the 
paradigm shift has not been translated into concrete actions.182 
 
Since the establishment of the African Union the continent it exercises powers over has 
experienced numerous situations that require the African Union intervention as 
established under its legal framework. Some of those situations have been covered in 
previous chapters. The response and performance of the African Union has been largely 
unsatisfactory, many opportunities to assert itself have been missed and this has resulted 
in the African Union being adjudged as not ready, willing and capable to transform its 
principles into practical action. This is evident from how the African Union has managed 
conflict situations in the continent, no clear policy has been used, and responses have 
varied, in terms of time taken to respond and support given after interventions. Of more 
interest to this study has been the African Union intervention and support given to 
accountability initiatives initiated both within the continent and before international; 
instruments after serious human rights violations have been committed.  
 
As this study was being undertaken the African Union was at the forefront of fighting the 
involvement of the international criminal court in African countries particularly, where the 
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indictments touch on heads of states and senior government officials. These recent 
developments and the previous track record of the African Union in supporting 
accountability for serious crimes committed in the continent will be reviewed in this 
chapter.  
 
5. 1  The will to prosecute the former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré  
 
Hissène Habré a former president of Chad who ruled from 1982 to 1990 when he was 
deposed has been living in exile in Senegal since he left power.  In 2000 he was indicted 
by a Senegalese judge after victims of violations sanctioned by him filed a criminal 
complaint. Senegal in response put him under house arrest, with the close watch of elite 
Senegalese armed forces.  
 
During more than two decades of exile, Habré has seen numerous parties seeking justice 
for his alleged crimes against humanity, torture and war crimes in Chad while in office, 
with recourse sought in a multitude of regional, national and international tribunals.183 
 
In 2000, shortly after Habré‟s indictment in Senegal, the Senegalese Appeal Court 
dismissed the case against him. Arguing mainly that the crimes in question were not 
committed in Senegal, and that it thus lacked jurisdiction to try Habré. This decision was 
upheld by Senegal‟s Cour de Cassation (their highest court). In response to this, Habré‟s 
alleged victims sought his extradition to Belgium as a country capable of holding a fair 
trial. Belgium then began investigating the Habré case under that country‟s universal 
jurisdiction law which allowed Belgium to prosecute certain atrocities no matter where 
they are committed. The Belgium court eventually issued an international arrest warrant 
against Habré. For the over two decades Habre has lived in Senegal, the authorities 
refused to extradite Habré to face the charges against him in other jurisdictions such as 
Belgium.184 
 
As a result of the pressure Senegal was receiving from various institutions including the 
UN committee against torture to prosecute Habre, Senegal reached out to the AU heads 
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of states summit for direction on which was the competent forum to try Habre. At its 
January 2006 summit the African Union set up a committee of eminent African jurists 
(CEAJ) to consider the options available for Habré's trial, giving priority for an African 
mechanism. In its report to the July 2006 African Union Summit, the CEAJ noted, that 
since Habré was in Senegal, it should exercise jurisdiction over him and bring him to trial. 
In its July 2006 African Union heads of states summit called on Senegal to prosecute 
Hissène Habré “on behalf of Africa”185 and President Wade declared that Senegal would 
do so.   Soon thereafter Senegal undertook a certain reforms in its laws to give the 
country jurisdiction to try the crimes that Habre was accused of and to remove the legal 
bottlenecks. However when it came to practically supporting Senegal to try the former 
Chad dictator the African Union failed to requests for funds to prosecute Habre, the AU 
was non-committal giving Senegal an excuse for further delays in bring Habre to trial.  
 
Believing that Senegal was flouting its legal obligations, Belgium approached the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in February 2009 to order that Habré be either tried or 
extradited by Senegal the decision by the ICJ was rendered in 2012. In response to this 
judgment, Senegal and the African Union agreed on a way to prosecute Habré. This 
decision also came at a time when Senegal had undergone regime change in 2012 with 
the former President Wade being replaced by President Macky Sall, who was considered 
progressive. The new regime change and the renewed calls by the African Union for the 
prosecution of Habre led to the creation of the Chambres Africaines Extraordinaires – a 
completely unique domestic court in Senegal created with specific jurisdiction over 
international crimes committed in Chad between 7 June 1982 and 1 December 1990 (the 
period during which Habré is alleged to have committed his crimes). In July 2013, Habre 
was finally charged before this court for crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture 
during his presidency in Chad.  
 
It has taken the victims of these crimes over twenty years to triumph impunity that had 
blocked the prosecution of Habre. With the charges coming when the African Union has 
been very critical of the role of the ICC in bringing accountability in Africa for serious 
crimes. At the time of opening the trials Reed Broody a lawyer who has been assisting 
the victims of Habre‟s violations to pursue justice aptly observed, that for all the 
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complaints about the ICC and Africa, the real problem has been the incapacity of African 
justice in the face of massive crimes.186 
 
This is exemplified by the fact that it took Senegal and by extension the African Union 
fifteen years to provide an accountability avenue for the Chadian victims to pursue justice 
against Habre. It is believed the African Union could have been more proactive in its 
support for the accountability for the crimes committed in Chad during Habre‟s reign. 
However sadly the reaction by the African Union is no different from many other similar 
situations where massive crimes have been committed in the continent.  
 
5. 2  Supporting the International Criminal Court (ICC) or fighting it?   
 
Prior to July 2008 Africa was perceived as having a good working relationship with the 
international criminal court. Several African States had approached the ICC authorizing it 
to open investigations in their countries for serious crimes committed there. These 
countries were Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African 
Republic. The African Union had seemed supportive of these processes. The turning 
point seems to have come in 2008  when the ICC prosecutor acting under authorization 
by the United Nations Security Council187 took an unprecedented decision requesting the 
court to issue an arrest warrant against a sitting President - Omar Al Bashir of Sudan. 
 
The African Union immediately began using its non-permanent members at the United 
Nations Security Council to push for a one year deferral from the Security Council. The 
African Union eventually made a request to defer the Sudan case for one year188 in 
August 2008. The United Nations Security Council never discussed the request and this 
attracted more wraths from the African Union especially after the court formally issued an 
arrest warrant against President Al Bashir in March 2009. 
 
At the July 2009 African Union Assembly of Heads of States and Government summit in 
Sirte, Libya, Libyan President Muammar al-Gaddafi rallied his fellow President‟s to adopt 
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what became known as the Sirte resolution189, in which African Union states resolved not 
to cooperate with the ICC in the arrest and surrender of President Omar Al Bashir. At the 
time of this decision the African Union was clear that it was only opposed to the Sudan 
case touching on a President and not to the court‟s interventions in Uganda, the DRC and 
CAR (situations of State referral), and Kenya, where the Prosecutor had then applied on 
his own initiative to open an investigation against the alleged perpetrators of post-election 
violence. 
 
The impact of the Sirte decision on the commitment to fight impunity was that it set off a 
trend by African leaders and in particular the African Union to seek ways to avoid 
accountability. After the Sirte decision numerous other African Union meetings discussed 
the ICC negatively to the extent of using disparaging language against the ICC 
prosecutor in the texts of the resolutions. In 2010 the African Union went as far as asking 
African countries that were members of the Rome Statute system to balance their 
obligations to the African Union in comparison to those of the Rome Statute.190 The 
negativity at the African Union increased exponentially when the prosecutor named five 
senior government officials individuals he was charging in Kenya for crimes against 
humanity.191 Kenya joined forces with Sudan in pushing for the ICC interventions in both 
countries to be stopped and the African Union meetings provided an environment that 
was conducive for these intentions. The African Union has increasingly become bolder in 
its pronunciations against the ICC cases and more so after two of the accused persons in 
the Kenya cases before the ICC were elected president and deputy president in 2013. 
 
In fact, it is important to note at the outset that the tensions between the ICC and African 
governments often disguise an important underlying fact: Africa‟s states are divided about 
the role that international justice should play in contributing to the continent‟s fight against 
impunity for serious crimes. 
 
In May 2013, the African Union while having its bi-annual meetings resolved to request 
the United Nations Security Council to defer the Kenyan cases for one year, this being 
the second time to request for such a deferral for the Kenya cases. The first deferral 
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request on the Kenya cases lodged in 2011 by Kenya‟s ambassador to the United 
Nations never got a formal response even though it was discussed during informal 
sessions by members of the Security Council.  
 
After this resolution Kenya rallied other African States and especially those who sit are 
non-permanent members of the Security Council to push for the halting of the Kenya 
cases, this campaign too did not succeed. In September 2013, the trial of the Deputy 
President William Ruto commenced as scheduled.  
 
In October in anticipation of the opening of the trial of President Kenyatta scheduled for 
November 2013, Kenya members of parliament intensified the campaign against the ICC, 
by calling on ICC African member states to withdraw from the Rome Statute. Parliament 
passed a motion for Kenya to withdraw from the Rome Statute.192 
 
In October 2013, Kenya together with Mauritania pushed for the African Union to hold an 
extra ordinary meeting to discuss Africa‟s relationship with the ICC. In the end despite a 
lack of unanimity the Heads of States and governments and other government 
representatives who attended adopted a resolution touching on several fundamental 
issues. First the states resolved that sitting heads of states should not be tried while in 
office, secondly they claimed President Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto should not 
attend the trials and also directed that another deferral request be lodged with the United 
Nations Security Council.193 The resolution went further to ask member states who 
wished to refer their country conflict situations to first seek approval from the African 
Union before doing so.  
 
Following up the resolution Kenya and other African countries moved the pressure to the 
United Nations Security Council, lodging the deferral request and requesting for a formal 
discussion of the request to delay the Kenya trials for one year. The Security Council this 
time granted the request for a formal discussion and in November 2013 the Security 
Council members voted on the request with seven voting in favor, none opposing but with 
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eight states abstaining194. The request did not get the requisite number of votes to 
succeed and therefore the deferral efforts did not succeed.  
 
The African Union member states postures towards the ICC are not homogenous. Each 
African case before the ICC is premised on varying circumstances and reasons, and so 
the ICC‟s relationships with individual African countries also vary.195 Mali‟s decision to 
refer the conflict in Mali to the ICC in 2012 despite the existing backlash against the court 
and the allegations of its targeting Africa, is a good example of this situation. It is possible 
then to expect that despite all the negativity it is likely more African countries will continue 
to refer cases to the ICC. Yet, the recent decisions outlined above and the follow up 
actions by the African Union member states demonstrate that Africa‟s leaders are 
becoming bolder and more vocal in their criticism and rejection of the ICC and the United 
National Security Council. 
 
The African Union says it remains committed to the fight against impunity and cites its 
Constitutive Act which gives the African Union the right to intervene to protect citizens 
against genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity as evidence. 
 
 It‟s position in 2009 has also changed and it now says that its frustration are limited only 
to the two cases touching on sitting heads of states, now the Sudan and Kenya cases, 
despite the fact that Kenya‟s president was indicted even before becoming a president.  
 
Efforts to establish alternative accountability mechanisms either domestic or regional 
have not borne much fruit. The African Union has discussed the possibility of empowering 
the African Court with criminal jurisdiction to try serious crimes such as those tried by the 
ICC. Most of these discussions have taken place during the African Union heads of states 
summit sessions discussing either the unfair application of universal jurisdiction by 
European countries against Africans or the intervention by the ICC in African countries. 
Progress in actualizing this mandate for the African court has been slow.  
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Conclusion 
The African Union track record in responding to conflicts in the continent appropriately 
has been evaluated as dismal. In many instances the African Union has failed to provide 
leadership in negotiating the end of conflicts forcing many African countries to invite 
intervention and assistance from other partners. The African Union has also not been 
keen in investing in pushing for accountability where massive crimes and violations have 
been committed.   
 
The standoff by the ICC and the African Union often overshadows one fundamental fact: 
that the continent is home to landmark efforts to address impunity. Several African states 
have been at the forefront in dealing with impunity. But while we can cite many good 
examples, we cannot continue to defend states who fail to protect citizens. Instead, the 
African Union must work more effectively to enforce accountability; it should translate its 
declarations on the fight against impunity into concrete actions that result in the protection 
of Africa‟s citizens. In fighting the existing accountability processes initiated by the ICC in 
the post conflict countries the African Union asserts that Africa has its own brand of 
justice that espouses reconciliation over sanctions or punishment. It is unmeritorious and 
discriminatory to claim that African victims do not deserve to seek criminal accountability 
for serious international crimes with standing equal to that of other victims of grave 
abuse.196 
 
The relentless search for justice by victims of massive crimes is evidence that 
accountability is desired by Africans and in the debate on how to address accountability 
in the continent this reality must not be lost.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
6 Conclusions and recommendations  
In this study the experiences of different African post conflict countries in addressing the 
causes of conflict have been analysed. the context as to why this study was considered 
necessary and the historical progression of how Africa finds itself in the current position, 
while dealing with accountability, in post conflict situations is laid out in the first two 
chapters.  
 
The responses by African post conflict states in bringing accountability for serious crimes 
committed within their territories and even extra-territorially have varied. In chapter three 
different approaches by two post conflict countries were reviewed where varying degrees 
of success in the approaches adopted were observed. In the end it can be concluded that 
the approach adopted by a state is dependent on the needs of the particular post conflict 
society as no conflict is similar and even though the root causes may seem identical, the 
underlying undertones that trigger conflict vary from society to society.  
 
Increasingly in addressing the causes of conflict in post conflict African states, emphasis 
seems to be given to truth and reconciliation processes as opposed to justice and 
accountability. The relegation of accountability to the back banner has contributed to 
increased levels of impunity and also seen the rise of strong victim groups in the 
continent that continue to push for justice and accountability for serious violations 
committed against them.  
 
In the absence of reliable judicial institutions to offer redress and accountability for 
serious crimes committed during conflict African states, victims and human rights 
campaigners have turned to international institutions for solutions. One such institution 
has been the international criminal court, which has criminal jurisdiction to try perpetrators 
of international crimes a court that has consistently received strong support from African 
states.  
 
The prosecution of high level perpetrators of serious violations who are influential 
members of society has ignited serious opposition from certain African leaders who 
consider that immunity from prosecution for serious crimes should extend to government 
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officials based on their official capacity. At the time of its adoption Rome Statute clearly 
outlawed immunity on the basis of official capacity. The reasoning at the time being that 
in most instances it is expected that those most responsible for the commission of 
systematic and large-scale human rights violations are persons of great influence in their 
societies and possibly have sufficient financial resources at their disposal to organise for 
the commission of the crimes.  
 
In chapter four, the role that the African Union plays in supporting accountability for 
serious crime has been scrutinized. The African Union has supported accountability in 
certain instances but increasingly as the ICC targets leaders in the highest echelons of 
power in situation countries before it, the African Union has been converted into a forum 
for rallying dissent against the ICC cases that specifically touch on influential leaders 
including Presidents.  
 
The African Union needs also to evaluate the impact and applicability of the decisions 
that the heads of states adopt during their meetings. For a serious continental body of its 
stature the adoption of resolutions and decision that are not enforceable by member 
states or those that support the violation of other legal instruments that the states have 
committed to risks denting the credibility of the institution.   
 
The support offered by the African Union to member states either with ongoing conflicts is 
also an issue that merits discussion. The responses as seen have not been uniform and 
in certain instances this is justifiable but varying the level of follow up and commitment to 
support conflict and post conflict situations cannot be justified. The continent has indeed 
seen improvement from how the African Union handles conflict situations in comparison 
to its predecessor the OAU. However, much improvement remains to be seen if the AU is 
to continue being the authoritative voice on peace and justice in the continent.  
 
 The African Union preferential treatment of perpetrators of serious atrocities can be 
adjudged as a step in the wrong direction. The world continues to move towards the 
embracing of accountability for serious crimes irrespective of the societal position of the 
perpetrator. While the existing justice mechanisms such as the international criminal court 
are faced with challenges, it is incumbent upon those who desire to see accountability to 
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seek to improve on the existing structures rather than seek to entrench impunity by 
finding ways of circumventing the existing accountability processes.  
 
The study deduced that victims of human rights violations have relentlessly supported 
accountability even in the most difficult circumstances. This was evidenced in the turn out 
by victims of violations committed during apartheid to give their stories and others to face 
the perpetrators of the violations. In Kenya many victims registered to participate in the 
ICC trials a reflection of their desire to have their day in court. The victim‟s desires 
therefore need not be curtailed by political maneuvers. 
 
6.1 Looking into the future 
 
It cannot be denied that conflicts within Africa and indeed worldwide continue to be a real 
threat to the peaceful enjoyment of life for citizens. It can also not be denied that for 
impunity not to take root the perpetrators of serious violations need to be brought into 
account.  
 
Africa has the capacity to take up prosecutions of serious crimes committed in Africa. 
What often lacks as deduced from the study is the political will to support the investigation 
and prosecution of the perpetrators of massive crimes. The situation is even dire when 
the most responsible perpetrators are influential members of society.  
 
The African Union and its member states must find effective ways to build on the appetite 
for justice by victims of serious and massive crimes and to build effective institutions in 
which African victims and citizens can have confidence in, to investigate and prosecute 
all perpetrators of serious crimes. The African Union proposition to empower the African 
Court with criminal jurisdiction over international crimes is good but it is important for the 
African Union to prepare effectively and commit to supporting the court adequately with 
the necessary financial and political support for it to effectively discharge such a crucial 
mandate.  
 
The African Union can also leverage its influence to galvanize support for member states 
to equip national jurisdictions with the capacity to prosecute those found responsible for 
crimes committed during conflict. National prosecutions as seen in the study remain one 
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of the most neglected approaches. States prefer to relegate the responsibility to other 
competent bodies such as the international criminal court. This trend is not sustainable in 
the long run especially if the ICC is to uphold its credibility. African countries must build 
capacity to prosecute with the continent and the progress by Senegal in setting up a court 
to try Hissene Habre should be considered a step in the right direction for the continent.  
 
The African Union needs to improve on its support for African states and societies that 
desire accountability for crimes committed within and away from their territories. The case 
of Mali who despite calls by the African Union for African states not to cooperate with the 
ICC referred its conflict to the ICC in 2012. A referral that was backed by the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS);this sends a clear message that Africa 
does not have a homogenous approach to post conflict justice. This is a reality that the 
African Union needs to take congnisance of and seek to address effectively in its 
accountability related interventions. 
 
For post conflict societies to transition effectively into peaceful societies political will is 
very key. In most post conflict societies political will to see through the holding to account 
the perpetrators of the serious crimes lacks. This is especially so in the context of 
societies where the ruling government was involved in the commission of the crimes. 
These situations entrench impunity and the possibility of a recurrence of a similar or 
worse conflict is usually high.  
 
African states and the African Union need to find a solution to the endemic problem of 
lack of political will to effectively address the underlying causes of conflict as well as bring 
accountability to perpetrators of the violations committed during conflict. If Africa 
continues to posture against the existing accountability mechanisms without offering 
credible solutions for the victims of atrocities then the continent will continue to be at 
cross-purpose with the rest of the world in moving towards complete accountability for 
serious crimes.  
 
In the end accountability and justice as observed need not operate in exclusion of other 
mechanisms and therefore an assessment of what model or approach best suits a 
country is crucial in addressing the past in any post conflict society.  
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Africa needs to establish credible institutions that can advance the post conflict 
accountability. The era of protecting perpetrators of serious conflict is gone and impunity 
for serious crimes must not be encouraged.  
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